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Kennedy: Sustainable Constitutional Growth?

COMMENT
Sustainable Constitutional Growth? The
“Right to Farm” and Missouri’s Review of
Constitutional Amendments
ANGELA KENNEDY*

INTRODUCTION
The Missouri River Basin is comprised of more than 100 million acres
of cropland across nine states, including Missouri.1 It produces nearly half of
U.S. wheat, nearly a quarter of its grain corn, and over a third of its cattle, and
in 2008, the value of these crops and livestock exceeded $100 billion.2 Missouri’s share in this revenue, however, contributed to less than three percent
of Missouri’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) in 2013:3 not what one would
call the “foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy,” or even a
“vital sector of Missouri’s economy.”4 Yet these assertions are memorialized
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1. The basin is comprised of Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Decadal Climate and Impacts
Prediction in the Missouri River Basin (MRB), MONTANA 1, http://drought.mt.gov/
Links/Documents/forcasting_decadal_climate_variability.pdf (last visited Jan. 11,
2016).
2. Id.
3. Mo. Econ. Research & Info. Ctr., Gross Domestic Product Data Series, 2013
Estimates, MO. DEP’T ECON. DEV., http://www.missourieconomy.org/indicators/
gsp/index.stm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). A figure of 1.7% included not only agriculture and forestry, but also hunting and fishing. Id.; see also MO. ECON. RESEARCH &
INFO. CTR., MO. DEP’T ECON. DEV., MISSOURI ECONOMIC REPORT 4 (2014),
http://www.missourieconomy.org/pdfs/2014_mo_economic_report.pdf
(putting
“Natural Resources (including Agriculture) and Mining” at 2.3% of Missouri’s gross
domestic product.). This figure was 7% in 2008. See Mo. Econ. Research & Info.
Ctr., Missouri Economic Impact Brief, Agricultural Industries, MO. DEP’T ECON.
DEV. (Oct. 2008), https://www.missourieconomy.org/pdfs/missouri_ag_impact.pdf.
4. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35.
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in the newly passed “right-to-farm” state constitutional amendment submitted
to, and endorsed by, Missouri’s popular vote in August 2014:5
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.
To protect this vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers
and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in this state, subject to duly authorized powers, if any,
conferred by article VI of the Constitution of Missouri.6

Historically, these assertions were certainly true of Missouri’s economy.7 Even now, when they are rote platitudes more than assertions of present
fact, Missouri does have an interest in protecting agriculture, both as a historically important sector and as a livelihood that supports many individual Missouri citizens. Missouri remains an important agricultural state, even as agriculture is dwarfed by industry.8 However, the placement of this amendment
in Missouri’s constitutional bill of rights, and its expansive constitutional
language, warrants some concern as to its actual effect. This is not really a
question of economics. Even if agriculture in Missouri produced twenty
times the revenue it does now, the amendment still might privilege certain
rights in Missouri at the expense of others – regardless of whether the majority of voting Missourians approved.
Indeed, while the amendment did receive a majority vote from Missouri
citizens, it was perhaps the barest majority possible at 50.12%.9 The controversial enactment of the right-to-farm amendment serves as a prime example
through which to examine judicial review of state constitutional amendments
both during and after the political process. The available legal challenges are
divisible into two general categories: (1) challenges to the political constitutional amendment process and (2) substantive challenges to constitutional
amendments themselves. This Comment will discuss these challenges as
applied to the right-to-farm amendment.10

5. Gov. Nixon Sets Election Dates for 2014 Ballot Measures, OFF. MO.
GOVERNOR JAY NIXON (May 23, 2014), https://governor.mo.gov/news/archive/govnixon-sets-election-dates-2014-ballot-measures.
6. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35.
7. Missouri, like many of the “Great Plains” states, was settled by farmers.
ROBYN BURNETT & KEN LUEBBERING, IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE SETTLEMENT OF
MISSOURI 95 (2005).
8. E-mail from Erin Morrow Hawley, Associate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo.
Sch. of Law, to author (Apr. 10, 2015, 7:25 PM) (on file with author).
9. State of Missouri – Primary Election – August 5, 2014, Official Results, MO.
SECRETARY ST., http://enrarchives.sos.mo.gov/enrnet/default.aspx (click on the
“Choose election type” dropdown box, then select “Primary Election – August 5,
2014” and click “Submit”) (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
10. See infra Part II.D.
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Part I discusses the historical background and enactment of the amendment. Next, Part II outlines the legal challenges available during the political
constitutional amendment process, detailing what challenges were – or were
not – made to the right-to-farm amendment during its enactment. Part III
discusses how Missouri courts generally review legislatively-referred constitutional amendments and how they would likely review challenges brought
under the right-to-farm amendment. Part IV discusses the adequacy of existing legal challenges to Missouri constitutional amendments – particularly on
the front end – when these amendments are enacted via a single election. It
also provides suggestions for the needed reform of this process. Even if the
right-to-farm amendment just reaffirms rights already available to Missouri
citizens, it was an expensive experiment on the state’s bill of rights. Ultimately, however, it seems to do more than that by foreclosing future legislative regulation of agriculture and possibly overturning existing statutory
measures. While this Comment is not an indictment of farmers’ rights, it
questions whether the existing constitutional amendment process, exemplified in the passage of the right-to-farm amendment, adequately corresponds
to the foundational nature of the Missouri Constitution.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Conflicts between agriculture and urbanization in Missouri are nearly as
old as the state itself. Following the Civil War, industrialization not only
revolutionized urban centers, but it also changed the landscape of farming
communities in Missouri.11 New technologies like barbed wire, threshers,
and baling machines dramatically decreased the labor and time required for
producing crops.12 This led to crop specialization and the formation of “bonanza farms,” and many small farmers were pushed off of their lands, unable
to compete.13 But farmers soon began to face additional competition beyond
their fellow farmers. Throughout the mid- to late-nineteenth century, a number of farmers brought nuisance actions against businesses and cities, as the
latter’s expansion damaged the farmers’ crops.14
11. Angela Bell, Lesson 2: The Urban North and the Rural West, HIST. 1200:
SURVEY OF AM. HIST. SINCE 1865, http://online.missouri.edu/exec/data/courses/2626/
public/lesson02/lesson02.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 53 S.W. 907 (Mo. 1899) (farmer brought nuisance
claim against city, alleging that its sewer system contaminated the stream that he used
for his livestock and other farming purposes); Brown v. Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 80
Mo. 457, 458 (1883); Dickson v. Chi., Rock Island & P. R.R. Co., 71 Mo. 575, 576
(1880) (farmer brought action for nuisance against railroad for building a dam that
flooded farmer’s property); Van Hoozier v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 70 Mo.
145, 146 (1879) (farmer brought action for nuisance against railroad for building a
dam that flooded farmer’s property); Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875) (farmer
brought action for nuisance against mill owner whose dam water-logged part of the

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 20

208

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Over the next century, agriculture, cities, and business in Missouri continued to grow side-by-side at various paces. By 2012, the value of farms in
Missouri was at record highs – up twenty-two percent since 2007.15 That
being said, the future of Missouri farms was, and still is, somewhat uncertain,
as farmland continues to be lost to expanding “residential, commercial and
industrial land uses.”16 The number of farms in Missouri is decreasing,17 and
the amount of farmland in the state decreased by nearly one million acres
between 2007 and 2012.18 More worrisome still, as of 2012, seventy-one
percent of Missouri farmers were over age fifty-five.19 Only 12.6% of Missouri farmers were under age forty-four.20

farmer’s property); Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517, 518 (1848) (small farm
brought action for nuisance against a large distillery and hog-farm operation for contaminating water); Powers v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 71 Mo. App. 540
(1897) (farmer brought claim for nuisance against railroad for building too small of a
canal and causing his property to flood); Thomas v. Concordia Cannery Co., 68 Mo.
App. 350 (1897) (farmer brought nuisance against canning factory for spilling refuse
onto his property, contaminating the water that ran through his property, and making
his property unfit for farming and pasturing); Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 Mo. App. 59,
60 (1894) (farmer brought nuisance action against brick kiln, alleging that its smoke
and gases had destroyed his crops); Carson v. City of Springfield, 53 Mo. App. 289,
298 (1893) (farmer brought nuisance action against city for draining water onto and
flooding his land); McKee v. St. Louis, Keokuk & Nw. R.R. Co., 49 Mo. App. 174,
179 (1892) (farmer brought action for nuisance against railroad for building a dam
that flooded farmer’s property).
15. Table 1. Historical Highlights: 2012 and Earlier Census Years, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC., http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_
Chapter_1_State_Level/Missouri/st29_1_001_001.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
16. Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do
Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 90 n.22 (2006)
(citing Farming on the Edge: Sprawling Development Threatens America’s Best
Farmland, AM. FARMLAND TRUST (2002), http://www.farmland.org/farmingonthe
edge/Farmingon the Edge.pdf) (“From 1992–97, the United States converted more
than 6 million acres of agricultural land to a more developed use. It has been estimated that our country loses two acres of farmland every minute.”).
17. Table 1. Historical Highlights: 2012 and Earlier Census Years, supra note
15. The number of farms has gone from 107,825 in 2007 to 99,171 in 2012 – a decrease of 8654 farms. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. According to the 2012 agricultural census, only 0.7% of Missouri farmers are under age 25, 4.7% are between the ages of 25 and 34, 7.2% are between 35
and 44, 16.4% are between the ages of 45 and 54, approximately 26% are between the
ages of 55 and 64, and approximately 45% are over age 65. See Table 69. Summary
by Age and Primary Occupation of Principal Operator: 2012, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1
_State_Level/Missouri/st29_1_069_069.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
20. Table 1. Historical Highlights: 2012 and Earlier Census Years, supra note
15.
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Technological advancements have improved agricultural productivity,
further reducing farm labor in the state by nearly twenty-nine percent between 2002 and 2007.21 Indeed, contemporary agriculture operations involve
“factory” more than “family” farms.22 More animals are concentrated in fewer operations, and confinement is now the primary method of animal production.23 For example, the number of hogs in the state of Missouri stayed
roughly the same between 1982 and 2007, while the number of Missouri’s
hog farms during that period dropped by nearly ninety percent.24
These concentrated animal operations pose increased environmental and
health risks. As the U.S. General Accounting Office reported, “Nationwide,
about 130 times more animal waste is produced than human waste—roughly
5 tons for every U.S. citizen—and some operations with hundreds of thousands of animals produce as much waste as a town or a city.”25 This waste
puts pollutants into the environment that are harmful to human health.26 Similarly, the widespread application of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers to
crops can also contribute to health problems, like birth defects, nerve damage,

21. Mo. Econ. Research & Info. Ctr., Missouri Economic Research Brief, Farm
and Agribusiness, MO. DEP’T ECON. DEV. (Mar. 2009), https://www.missouri
economy.org/pdfs/missouri_farms_and_agribusiness.pdf.
22. James S. Cooper, Slaughterhouse Rules: How Ag-Gag Laws Erode the Constitution, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 233, 233–35 (2013).
23. ROBBIN MARKS, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CESSPOOLS OF SHAME, HOW
FACTORY FARM LAGOONS AND SPRAYFIELDS THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PUBLIC
HEALTH
4
(July
2001),
https://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/cesspools/cesspools.pdf. For example, from
1980 to 2011, the number of hog operations in the United States dropped from
666,000 to roughly 69,000, yet the number of hogs sold remains almost the same. Id.
24. Compare Table 29. Hogs and Pigs—Inventory: 1982 and 1978, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC.,
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/AgCensusImages/1982/01/25/121/Table-29.pdf
(last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (22,859 farms with 3,186,443 hogs in 1982), with Table
12. Hogs and Pigs—Inventory and Sales: 2012 and 2007, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_2
_US_State_Level/st99_2_012_012.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (2,999 farms with
3,101,269 hogs in 2007). There was an 87% decrease in farms, and only a 3% decrease in hogs. See Table 29. Hogs and Pigs—Inventory: 1982 and 1978, supra;
Table 12. Hogs and Pigs—Inventory and Sales: 2012 and 200, supra.
25. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, WASTE MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES
1
(July
1999)
(footnote
omitted),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99205.pdf.
26. Animal Feeding Operations FAQs, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/animalfeeding-operations-afos (last updated Jan. 5, 2016) (“Manure and wastewater from
[animal feeding operations] have the potential to contribute pollutants such as nitrogen and phosphorus, organic matter, sediments, pathogens, heavy metals, hormones,
antibiotics, and ammonia to the environment.”).
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and cancer.27 Thus, the inevitable industrialization of the farm has changed
the agricultural landscape dramatically, yet states continue to take a “handsoff” approach to agriculture regulations.28
In 2010, it appeared that this approach might be changing. Missouri
passed new, restrictive legislation that Missouri Farm Bureau president Blake
Hurst called a “sort of a wake-up call to agriculture.”29 Colloquially titled
“Proposition B,” this statute imposed new requirements on dog breeders for
more humane conditions.30 It subjected offending breeders to fines and penalized repeat offenders with criminal citations.31 Proposition B had been
sponsored largely by out-of-state animal rights groups and was interpreted by
some within the agricultural community as “outsiders” telling farmers how to
raise their animals.32
On the heels of this major legislative blow to Missouri agricultural
groups, a class of plaintiffs won an $11 million odor nuisance suit against a
northwestern Missouri hog farm.33 In response, agricultural lobbyists and
proponents marshalled to the cause of protecting the rights of Missouri ranchers and farmers from outsiders several generations removed from the farm.34
Various Missouri legislators proposed bills to protect farmers’ rights to raise
animals and perform other farming practices, and it was against this backdrop
in January 2013 that Bill Reiboldt and Jason Smith in the Missouri House of
Representatives introduced the bills that would become the right-to-farm

27. Pesticides and Food: Health Problems Pesticides May Pose, EPA,
http://facweb.northseattle.edu/twkaufman/NTR%20150/Helpful%20Links/
EPA_Pesticides%20and%20health%20risks.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2013).
28. Nadia S. Adawi, State Preemption of Local Control over Intensive Livestock
Operations, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10506 (2014).
29. Jo Mannies, Proposed ‘Right to Farm’ Constitutional Amendment Likely to
End Up in Court, ST. LOUIS BEACON (June 17, 2013, 6:13 AM), https://www.
stlbeacon.org/#!/content/31349/right_to_farm_061113_.
30. See, e.g., Interests Outside of Missouri are Financing Proposition B, MO.
FARM BUREAU, http://www.mofb.org/NewsMedia/News.aspx?articleID=103 (last
visited Jan. 11, 2016).
31. 2010 Initiative Petitions Approved for Circulation in Missouri, Statutory
Amendment to Chapter 273, Relating to Dog Breeders, MO. SECRETARY ST.,
http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2010petitions/2010-085 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
32. Interests Outside of Missouri are Financing Proposition B, supra note 30.
33. Owens v. ContiGroup Cos., 344 S.W.3d 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). The
Western District Court of Appeals affirmed March 29, 2011. Id.
34. See, e.g., Ashley Jost, Senate Passes “Right to Farm,” House Unsatisfied,
MO. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://themissouritimes.com/2353/senate-passes-right-tofarm-house-unsatisfied/; Cyndi Young, Right to Farm is not Us vs. Them,
BROWNFIELD AG NEWS FOR AM. (July 24, 2014), http://brownfieldagnews.com/
2014/07/24/right-to-farm-is-not-us-vs-them/; Tyler Castner, Smart Decision 2014:
Analyzing Amendment One – The Right to Farm, KOMU, http://www.komu.com/
news/smart-decision-2014-analyzing-amendment-one-the-right-to-farm/ (last updated
Aug. 4, 2014, 1:42 PM).
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amendment.35 Their separate efforts were consolidated into a single bill,36
which was revised37 and reported to the Senate in March 2013.38

35. Representative Bill Reiboldt introduced Joint House Resolution 11, which

read:
That agriculture, which provides food, energy, and security, is the foundation
and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy. To protect this vital sector of
Missouri’s economy, it shall be the right of persons to raise livestock in a humane manner without the state imposing an undue economic burden on animal
owners. No law criminalizing the welfare of any livestock shall be valid unless based upon generally accepted scientific principles and enacted by the
general assembly.

H.R.J. Res. No. 11, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013),
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/intro/HJR0011I.PDF
(last
visited Jan. 11, 2016). Representative Jason Smith introduced Joint House Resolution
7, which read:
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is
the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy. To protect this
vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in modern farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in
this state. No law shall be enacted which abridges the right of farmers and
ranchers to employ agricultural technology and modern livestock production
and ranching practices. That the citizens of this state have a right to hunt, fish,
and harvest wildlife. The control, management, restoration, conservation, and
regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry, and all wildlife resources of the
state, and the administration of all laws pertaining thereto, is vested in a conservation commission, as provided in article IV, section 40, Constitution of
Missouri. No law and no rule or regulation shall unreasonably restrict hunting, fishing, and harvesting wildlife or the use of traditional devices and
methods. Laws, rules, and regulations authorized under this section shall have
the purpose of wildlife conservation and management and preserving the future of hunting and fishing. Public hunting and fishing shall be a preferred
means of managing and controlling wildlife. This section shall not be construed to modify any provision of common law or statutes relating to trespass
or property rights.

H.R.J. Res. No. 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), http://www.house.
mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/intro/HJR0007I.PDF (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
36. A new joint resolution combined 11 and 7:
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is
the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy. To protect this
vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in modern farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in
this state. No law shall be enacted which abridges the right of farmers and
ranchers to employ agricultural technology and modern livestock production
and ranching practices.
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The Missouri Senate, however, resisted language in the House’s bill that
barred initiative petitions39 to regulate farming practices, and they offered
their own substitute bill.40 This was again amended41 and voted on in its final
form in May 2013.42 More than eighty percent of House members supported
H.R.J. Res. Nos. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013),
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/commit/HJR0011C.PDF (last
visited Jan. 11, 2016).
37. The last sentence was revised as follows: “No state law shall be enacted
which abridges the right of farmers and ranchers to employ agricultural technology
and modern and traditional livestock production and ranching practices, unless enacted by the General Assembly.” Perfected H.R.J. Res. Nos. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013) (emphasis added), http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/
bills131/billpdf/perf/HJR0011P.PDF (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
38. Activity History for HJR 11, MO. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.
house.mo.gov/BillActions.aspx?bill=HJR11&year=2013&code=R (last visited Jan.
11, 2016).
39. Initiative petitions are constitutional amendments or statutes initiated directly
by a state citizen and then put on the ballot for popular vote. MO. CONST. art. III, §§
49–53; id. at art. XII, §2(b).
40. Senate Substitute for House Committee Substitute for House Joint Resolution
Nos. 11 & 7, http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/hlrbillspdf/0132S.
03F.PDF (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). The senate substitute ended with:
No state law shall be enacted which abridges the right of farmers and ranchers
to engage in agricultural production and ranching practices, unless enacted by
the General Assembly. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to abrogate the authority of political subdivisions to exercise powers vested therein
by the laws of the state of Missouri.

Id. (emphasis added).
41. Journal of the Senate, Forty-Seventh Day, MO. SENATE (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://www.senate.mo.gov/13info/Journals/RDay470410724-737.pdf#toolbar=1.
A
proposed senate amendment was ultimately rejected: “This section shall not apply to
animals. ‘Animal’ shall be defined as any dog or cat, which is being used, or is intended for use, for research, teaching, testing, breeding, or exhibition purposes, or as a
pet.” Id.
42. Activity History for HJR 11, supra note 38. The final joint house resolution,
the language of which became effective as Section 35 of Article I of the Missouri
Constitution, read as follows:
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is
the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy. To protect this
vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in this
state, subject to duly authorized powers, if any, conferred by article VI of the
Constitution of Missouri.

Truly Agreed To and Finally Passed, H.R.J. Res. Nos. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/truly/
HJR0011T.PDF (last visited Jan. 11. 2016).
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the bill, and the Senate vote, also exceeding an eighty percent majority, carried the proposed constitutional amendment to the 2014 ballot.43
Proponents and opponents of the amendment then went to work advocating for their respective positions. Both sides spent millions of dollars
campaigning on the internet, on television, and through mail and phone
calls.44 Proponents of the amendment claimed not only that it would protect
family farms from out-of-state animal rights groups, but they also campaigned for its enactment on the grounds that it would increase revenue and
food supplies and create jobs.45 Opponents of the amendment worried about
the amendment’s broad, vague language and claimed instead that it would
benefit large, foreign-owned corporate farms at the expense of small family
farms.46
Governor Jay Nixon put the measure to a public vote on August 5,
2014,47 where it passed by a margin of less than one percent.48 Wes Shoemyer, a former member of the Missouri Senate,49 petitioned for a recount of the
votes under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.601, which provides that
any “person whose position on a question was defeated by less than one-half
of one percent of the votes cast on the question shall be allowed a recount.”50
On September 15, 2014, the Secretary of State’s office confirmed that the
amendment had been passed by a majority vote.51 Mr. Shoemyer then filed
an additional post-election challenge to the amendment with the Supreme
Court of Missouri under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.557.52
43. Activity History for HJR 11, supra note 38. The Missouri House of Representatives voted 132 to 25 in favor of the amendment and the Missouri Senate voted
28 to 6 in favor of the amendment. Id.
44. Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response Brief, Shoemyer v. Kander, 464
S.W.3d 171 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (No. SC94516), 2015 WL 718363, at *5–6.
45. Elizabeth Crisp, Legislature Sends ‘Right to Farm’ to Missouri Voters, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 14, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/govt-and-politics/legislature-sends-right-to-farm-to-missourivoters/article_c9e4baa4-fd66-5fb4-adb6-d21f4375d5c2.html.
46. Richard R. Oswald, Missouri Amendment Could Hurt Family Farms, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
opinion/columns/missouri-amendment-could-hurt-family-farms/article_817e34b52913-5a3b-a7f6-b8c31d12e297.html.
47. Gov. Nixon Sets Election Dates for 2014 Ballot Measures, supra note 5.
48. Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response Brief, supra note 44, at *6.
49. SENATOR WES SHOEMYER, http://www.senate.mo.gov/10info/members/
mem18.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
50. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.601 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
51. Aja J. Williams, Recount Confirms Mo. Right to Farm Passage, KSDK
(Sept.
15,
2014,
10:41
PM),
http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/09/15/missouri-right-to-farmamendment-recount-passage/15700643/.
52. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, Shoemyer
v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 171 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (No. SC94516), 2014 WL 7669492,
at *7.
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II. CHALLENGES TO MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Since 1875, the Missouri Constitution has given Missourians the power
to directly adopt constitutional amendments proposed either by citizens (by
“initiative”) or by the legislature.53 Any such proposal may be enacted if
approved in a statewide, majority-rule election.54 These proposals and elections can be subject to judicial review,55 though “[j]udicial intervention is not
an appropriate substitute for the give and take of the political process.”56
Chapters 115 and 116 of the Missouri Code govern this process.57 They allow for procedural challenges specific to constitutional amendments “by initiative,” as well as broader procedural challenges for both types of amendments. This Part will discuss the procedural challenges available under Missouri statutes, the substantive challenges available constitutionally, and the
application of these challenges to the right-to-farm amendment.

A. Procedural Challenges Specific to Constitutional Amendments by
Initiative
Petitions to amend the constitution by initiative require signatures of
eight percent of legal voters in two-thirds of Missouri congressional districts.58 These petitions must meet certain requirements as to form, circulation, and submission in order to be valid.59 There are two specific challenges
that can overcome the successful submission of an initiative petition: signature withdrawal and a challenge to the sufficiency of the petition.60 The first
is available only to those who have signed the petition, and the second is
available to any citizen.61
Under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 116.110, signers of the petition
may withdraw their signatures before the petition is submitted by filing a
53. See MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 49–53; id. at art. XII, §§ 2(a)–(b).
54. Id. at art. III, § 52(b); id. at art. XII, § 2(b). For an excellent description and

analysis of initiative petitions in general in Missouri, see Nicholas R. Theodore,
Comment, We the People: A Needed Reform of State Initiative and Referendum Procedures, 78 MO. L. REV. 1401, 1416 (2013).
55. United Gamefowl Breeders Ass’n of Mo. v. Nixon, 19 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Mo.
2000) (en banc).
56. State ex rel. Humane Soc’y of Mo. v. Beetem, 317 S.W.3d 669, 674 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2010).
57. “This chapter shall apply to elections on statewide ballot measures. The
election procedures contained in chapter 115 shall apply to elections on statewide
ballot measures, except to the extent that the provisions of chapter 116 directly conflict, in which case chapter 116 shall prevail . . . .” MO. REV. STAT. § 116.020 (2000).
58. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 50.
59. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 116.050; MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 116.040, .080, .332
(West 2016); Mo. Roundtable for Life v. Carnahan, 676 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 2012).
60. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.110, .200.
61. Id.
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statement with the Missouri Secretary of State.62 After the petition has been
submitted, however, withdrawal based on a changed opinion will not render a
petition ineffective.63 In Rekart v. Kirkpatrick, the Supreme Court of Missouri reasoned that petition signatures merely place proposed amendments
before voters;64 they do not signify support for the ultimate proposition.65
Signors who have withdrawn support for the proposed amendment may simply vote against its adoption at election time.66 After submission to the secretary of state, signatures may only be withdrawn on grounds of fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, duress, or similar allegations.67
Such grounds, as well as any technical deficiency, would also support a
challenge to the petition as being otherwise “insufficient.”68 Under Missouri
Revised Statutes Section 116.200, any citizen may challenge the secretary of
state’s determination that a petition is sufficient or insufficient.69 This action
must be filed within ten days of the secretary’s decision.70 If the court decides that the petition is sufficient, the secretary of state must certify it as
sufficient.71 If the court decides the petition is not sufficient, it will enjoin the
secretary from certifying the petition and enjoin “all other officers from printing the measure on the ballot.”72 Any party may then appeal the court’s decision but must do so within ten days.73

B. Procedural Challenges Available for Both Kinds of Constitutional
Amendments
Citizens may make the following challenges to a proposed amendment
whether it was submitted by initiative, as described above, or by the legislature, whose proposed amendments require a simple majority vote by the Gen-

62. Id. § 116.110. This statement must identify the signor’s name and address
and the name of the petition signed. Id.
63. Rekart v. Kirkpatrick, 639 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (“An individual’s signature on an initiative petition serves only to secure
placement of a proposition before the voters; it does not foreclose the signatory’s
right to vote his conscience for or against the proposition when it appears on a ballot.”)
67. See MO. REV. STAT. § 116.090 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (providing for penalties of
those who falsify signatures); Rekart, 639 S.W.2d at 609.
68. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.200 (2000).
69. Id.; see also State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 130 S.W. 689 (Mo. 1910)
(discussing the secretary of state’s authority and role in this manner as purely ministerial, with no discretion).
70. § 116.200.3.
71. Id. § 116.200.1.
72. Id. § 116.200.2.
73. Id. § 116.200.3.
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eral Assembly.74 Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 116 provides for one
challenge specific to proposed constitutional amendments, and the remaining
challenges are general challenge provisions applicable to all elections, found
in Chapter 115.75

1. Pre-Election Ballot Title and Fiscal Note Challenges
Within ten days after the secretary’s certification of a proposed constitutional amendment, any citizen may challenge the amendment’s fiscal note or
ballot title for insufficiency or unfairness by bringing a Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 116.190 action in Cole County.76 The fiscal note of an
amendment estimates the amendment’s “cost or savings, if any, to state or
local governmental entities.”77 The ballot title of an amendment is what is
presented to voters on the ballot.78 It is comprised of the summary statement
and fiscal note summary – either of which is challengeable under Section
116.190.79
The summary statement is “a true and impartial statement of the purposes of the proposed measure in language neither intentionally argumentative
nor likely to create prejudice either for or against the proposed measure.”80
The summary “should accurately reflect the legal and probable effects of the
proposed initiative.”81 Similarly, the fiscal note summary “summarizes the
fiscal note prepared for the measure in language neither argumentative nor
likely to create prejudice for or against the proposed measure.”82 Neither
summary may exceed fifty words.83
The legislature may, but is not required to, prepare the fiscal note, fiscal
note summary, and summary statement.84 In the event the legislature proposes a constitutional amendment without a fiscal note or fiscal note summary,
the state auditor will prepare these portions.85 If the legislature proposes an
amendment without a summary statement, the secretary of state will prepare
that portion.86
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(a).
See MO. REV. STAT. Chapters 115 and 116.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West 2016).
MO. REV. STAT. § 116.175 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
MO. REV. STAT. § 116.155 (2000).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190.3.
MO. REV. STAT. § 116.155.2 (2000).
Seay v. Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Archey v.
Carnahan, 373 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)).
82. § 116.155.3.
83. Id. § 116.155.2–3.
84. Id. § 116.160, .170.
85. Id. § 116.170; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 116.175 (Cum. Supp. 2013)
(providing for judicial review or review by the attorney general).
86. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.160 (2000) (subject to review by the attorney general).
For a discussion of this process, see Theodore, supra note 54.
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A challenge brought under Section 116.190 must state why the amendment’s fiscal note or ballot title summaries are insufficient or unfair.87 Missouri courts have defined these terms in recent opinions: “[T]he words insufficient and unfair . . . mean to inadequately and with bias, prejudice, deception and/or favoritism state the [consequences of the initiative].”88 Ultimately, the test is whether voters will be “deceived or misled”89 or, similarly,
whether language on the ballot “likely creates prejudice for or against the
measure.”90
The Section 116.190 challenge must also request a different fiscal note
or ballot title summary.91 The court is empowered to certify the existing language to the secretary, change and then certify the language to the secretary,
or remand a challenged fiscal note and summary to the auditor for preparation
of a new fiscal note and summary.92 Either party may appeal the court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Missouri within ten days.93 If the court orders
a change to the ballot title language, the state bears the costs of reprinting.94
Courts serve the “limited function” in ballot title challenge cases of only
evaluating and correcting the ballot language.95 Indeed, the Supreme Court
of Missouri has emphasized how little this statute allows the court to do:
while it “authorizes an action to challenge the ballot title . . . it does not authorize an injunction to stop the election. If the ballot title challenge is timely
filed, the court is authorized to do no more than certify a correct ballot title.”96 In these cases, “the [c]ourts are editors, not executioners.”97

87. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West 2016).
88. Missourians Against Human Cloning v. Carnahan, 190 S.W.3d 451, 456

(Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Hancock v. Sec’y of State, 885
S.W.2d 42, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)). Note, however, that although this quote describes insufficient and unfair “the proper consideration is whether the ballot title is
‘insufficient or unfair.’” Seay v. Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881, 888 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App.
2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Mo. Mun. League v. Carnahan, 364 S.W.3d 548,
552 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
89. Union Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
90. Prentzler v. Carnahan, 366 S.W.3d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State
ex rel. Humane Soc’y of Mo. v. Beetem, 317 S.W.3d 669, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)).
91. § 116.190.3.
92. Id. § 116.190.4. This statute was recently challenged as unconstitutional on
the grounds that the statute gives the courts legislative power. Dotson v. Kander, 435
S.W.3d 643 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). In Dotson, the appellants contended that the statute violates the separation of powers doctrine by authorizing the judiciary to redraft
legislation as a remedy. Opening Brief of Appellants Dotson and Morgan, Dotson,
435 S.W.3d 643 (No. SC94293), 2014 WL 3597956, at *38.
93. § 116.190.4.
94. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.195 (2000).
95. Prentzler, 366 S.W.3d at 557 (quoting Beetem, 317 S.W.3d at 674).
96. Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 829
(Mo. 1990) (en banc); see Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response Brief, supra note
44, at *11–12.
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And this is if the courts even reach the challenge on the merits. Ballot
title and fiscal note challenges have strict statutory limitations.98 In Knight v.
Carnahan, for example, Missouri citizens challenged the fiscal note and fiscal note summary of a ballot title, arguing that it did not fully account for and
inform voters of revenue the state would lose under a proposed measure
brought by initiative.99 The secretary of state had certified the ballot title in
February 2008 and then certified the sufficiency of the initiative petition in
August 2008.100 The citizens filed their challenge within ten days of the August initiative petition’s certification, but the trial court dismissed the action
as untimely.101 The citizens appealed, alleging that their challenge was
brought as to the sufficiency of the petition under Section 116.200.102
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held that because the citizens were challenging the sufficiency and fairness of the fiscal
note and summary, their action was subject to the statutory limitation of ten
days after the official ballot title was certified, rather than ten days after the
general sufficiency of the petition was certified.103 The court reasoned:
In section 116.190, the legislature provided a specific means and a
specific remedy for challenges to the fiscal note summary—as well as
a specific deadline. It is axiomatic that where two statutes address the
same subject matter and there is a necessary repugnance, the specific
controls over the general.104

Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action, holding
that the requirements of the specific statutory challenge controlled over the
requirements of the more general challenge.105
97. Thomas Rutherford, The People Drunk or the People Sober? Direct Democracy Meets the Supreme Court of Florida, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 61, 171 (2002).
98. See, e.g., § 116.190.
99. 282 S.W.3d 9, 18–19 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
100. Id. at 20.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
[U]nder the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali, section
116.190.1’s specific deadline would control. Correspondingly, we must presume that the legislature acts with purpose and does not insert idle verbiage
into a statute. Here the legislature provided a deadline in 116.190.1 for preelection challenges to the fiscal note summary; we do not read its language as
superfluous. Consequently, Appellants’ challenge to the fiscal note summary
was time-barred . . . .

Id. at 20–21 (citing Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of St. Louis v. Members of Bd. of
Aldermen of City of St. Louis, 92 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)).
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The legislature made a similar rule of construction explicit regarding
Chapter 115 challenges, which apply to general elections.106 Chapter 116
provides that “[t]he election procedures contained in chapter 115 shall apply
to elections on statewide ballot measures, except to the extent that the provisions of chapter 116 directly conflict, in which case chapter 116 shall prevail .
. . .”107 Thus, if Chapter 115 and Chapter 116 challenges conflict, the Chapter
116 provision will control.

2. Post-Election Irregularity Challenges
Unlike pre-election challenges, courts will not strike an already-enacted
amendment down “upon a mere technicality.”108 As mentioned above, Chapter 115 deals with general election procedure, and it currently provides two
post-election remedies: a recount and a new election.109 Unless it is a very
close election, these challenges must allege some level of irregularity in the
election process.
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.583 authorizes courts to order a
recount upon “a prima facie showing of irregularities which place the result
of any contested election in doubt.”110 This challenge may be brought by one
or more voters registered where the contested election was held,111 by any
candidate for election to any office,112 or by the election authority.113
106. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.001 (2000) (the chapter is known as the “Comprehensive Election Act of 1977”).
107. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.020 (2000); Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response
Brief, supra note 44, at *10.
108. Barnes v. Bailey, 706 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). See also 16 AM.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 41 (“Although the procedure outlined in a state’s constitution for the adoption of a constitutional amendment is mandatory and must be followed, the courts are reluctant to declare a constitutional amendment which has been
adopted by the people invalid on technical grounds. Thus, if a proposed constitutional amendment is published, submitted to a vote of the people, and adopted without
any question having been raised prior to the election as to the method by which the
amendment gets before them, a favorable vote by the people will cure defects in the
form of the submission. The test for determining whether technical defects will invalidate an otherwise valid amendment is whether the cumulative effect of the technical
defects is harmless or fatal to the ballot or amendment.”).
109. Landwersiek v. Dunivan, 147 S.W.3d 141, 149–50 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); Bd.
of Election Comm’rs of St. Louis Cty. v. Knipp, 784 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Mo. 1990) (en
banc) (“The election law provides two remedies in an election contest when irregularities are shown: Section 115.583, RSMo 1986, permits the circuit court to order a
recount; Section 115.593, RSMo 1986, authorizes the circuit court to order a new
election.”).
110. § 115.583.
111. Id. § 115.553.2.
112. Id. § 115.553.1.
113. Id. § 115.600. The election authority is only permitted to seek recount, not a
new election. Knipp, 784 S.W.2d at 798.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 20

220

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Alternatively, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.601 allows a person who supported a measure that was defeated in an election to request a
recount of all of the votes on that measure.114 This challenge may only be
brought when the margin of defeat was less than one percent, allowing for
one additional count of the votes.115
The second, more drastic challenge for statewide constitutional amendment elections under Chapter 115 allows a voter to contest the result of any
election on any question by alleging “irregularities.”116 This election contest
must be filed directly in the Supreme Court of Missouri within thirty days of
the official announcement of the election’s result.117 The Supreme Court of
Missouri is empowered under Section 115.593 to order a new election.118 It
will do so if there are “irregularities of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on
the validity of the initial election.”119
But the term “irregularity” in this statute is not defined, nor have courts
definitively interpreted it.120 Existing Missouri precedent has only ever found
the “violation of an election statute”121 to be an irregularity for purposes of an
election contest, reasoning that “following the legislature’s dictates would be
regular and deviation irregular.”122 Thus, while the term “irregularities” refers to procedural problems, and not the substantive language of a proposed
measure,123 these irregularities must be “more than petty procedural infirmi-

114.
115.
116.
117.

MO. REV. STAT. § 115.601 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 115.553 (2000).
“[A]ll contests to the results of elections on constitutional amendments, on
state statutes submitted or referred to the voters, and on questions relating to the retention of appellate and circuit judges subject to article V, section 25 of the state constitution shall be heard and determined by the supreme court.” Id. § 115.555; see also
id. § 115.557. This is as opposed to primary election contests, which are brought in
circuit court under other sections. Id. § 115.529; MO. REV. STAT. §115.531 (Cum.
Supp. 2013).
118. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.593 (2000). As are all Missouri courts. Id.
119. Id.; see also id. § 115.553.
120. Gerrard v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 913 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
121. Id.; see also Marre v. Reed, 775 S.W.2d 951 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); Eversole
v. Wood, 754 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Gasconade R–III Sch. Dist. v. Williams, 641 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Clark v. Trenton, 591 S.W.2d 257 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979).
122. Gerrard, 913 S.W.2d at 90; see also Brief of the State, Dotson v. Kander,
464 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (No. SC94492), 2014 WL 7642036, at *15
(“The term ‘irregularity’ - which is never used in chapter 116 but used several times
in chapter 115 - always refers to problems in the process, and not in the substantive
provisions under consideration (or the ballot title for that matter).”).
123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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ties.”124 Furthermore, the court must be “firmly convinced” that these irregularities actually affected the outcome of the election.125
Indeed, a new election is a drastic remedy and is “to be used sparingly.”126 Unlike the recount, which affects the “result” of an election – that is,
the official announcement of the outcome127 – a new election “tosses aside
the aggregate of the citizens’ votes, both those properly and improperly cast,
and for that reason, a new election remedy is appropriate where the validity of
the entire election is under suspicion, not simply the result of the election.”128
At present, while election contests have been successfully brought for
local elections,129 the Supreme Court of Missouri has never ordered a new
election for state-wide election contests, such as for a constitutional amendment or statute referred to voters.130

124. Barks v. Turnbeau, 573 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (“[Absentee
voting irregularities were] more than petty procedural infirmities but abuses of the
election law which cannot be ignored. . . . In this case there are just too many instances of actions dissonant with the directives of the ‘Comprehensive Election Act’
to be disregarded or considered immaterial to the fundamental purposes of the Act.”).
125. Gerrard, 913 S.W.2d at 90 (citing Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. Knipp, 784
S.W.2d 797, 798 (Mo. 1990) (en banc)).
126. Id. See also Landwersiek v. Dunivan, 147 S.W.3d 141, 149–50 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2004); Mickels v. Henderson, 642 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(“[E]lection irregularities seldom result in a new election as there are other provisions
available to punish and deter those who intentionally and purposefully tamper with
the election process.”); Turnbeau, 573 S.W.2d at 681 (“[T]he decision to overturn an
election and thereby disenfranchise the voters should not be taken lightly.”).
127. Landwersiek, 147 S.W.3d at 149–50 (“The term ‘result’ as used in section
115.583 refers to the official announcement of the winning candidate and not the
conduct of the election.”).
128. Knipp, 784 S.W.2d at 799 (citing Nichols v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 1 of
Laclede Cty., 364 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Mo. 1963) (en banc) (distinguishing between validity
of election as a whole and the legality of individual ballots or category of votes). But
see Marre v. Reed, 775 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (“The latter section [of
115.583] declares that ‘[w]here the issue is drawn over the validity of certain votes
cast, a prima facie case is made if the validity of a number of votes equal to or greater
than the margin of defeat is placed in doubt.’ Without question the legislature intended that when the validity of a number of votes equal to or greater than the margin
of defeat is placed in doubt, then the election result is cast in doubt and a prima facie
case is made justifying a recount under § 115.583. By the same token such finding
constitutes ‘irregularities of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on the validity of the
initial election’ justifying a new election under § 115.593. Both statutes require that a
showing of irregularities place the result of the election in doubt. These statutes, in
pari materia, are clearly in harmony and readily bespeak the showing necessary to
justify the remedy authorized therein.”).
129. See, e.g., Landwersiek, 147 S.W.3d at 149–50.
130. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.555 (2000).
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3. New Interpretations of these Rules: Dotson v. Kander
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Missouri’s opinion in Dotson v. Kander
suggested that these strict statutory provisions might be open to a more liberal
construction.131 Samuel Dotson, a Missouri citizen, brought a ballot title
challenge to a legislatively-referred constitutional amendment that was put on
the same August 2014 ballot as the right-to-farm amendment.132 He brought
this challenge in mid-June, approximately six weeks before the election.133
The trial court dismissed the challenge as moot because under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.125.2, “[n]o court shall have the authority to order
an individual or issue be placed on the ballot less than six weeks before the
date of the election.”134 In that case, the trial court entered its judgment a
week into the six-week period.135
On appeal, while the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed that it was not
empowered to make any changes to the ballot title, rendering the claim moot,
it opened the door to possible post-election ballot title challenges.136 It dismissed Dotson’s concern that the trial court’s interpretation would totally
foreclose judicial review of ballot titles, reasoning:
This concern does not justify abandoning a settled construction of this
provision, particularly in light of the fact that judicial review of a
claim that a given ballot title was unfair or insufficient (when not pre-

131.
132.
133.
134.

435 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 115.125.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).

The legislature’s decision to establish a ‘bright line’ rule prohibiting courtordered changes to the ballot within six weeks of an election was not arbitrary.
It coincides with the printing and availability of absentee ballots, which is to
begin six weeks prior to an election. In addition, overseas military ballots are
to be printed and made available 45 days before an election.
If ballot titles are modified after the six-week pre-election time frame, local
election authorities would have to reprint ballots. Also, absentee and overseas
military voters would be voting on a different ballot title than in-person voters.
Further, a candidate is not permitted to withdraw after six weeks before the
election, nor will a disqualified candidate’s name be removed from a ballot
outside the same time frame.

Id. at 645 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 644 (“[T]his six-week period prior to the August 5 election ended on
June 24, a date that already had passed when the trial court entered its judgment on
July 1.”).
136. Id.
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viously litigated and finally determined) is available in the context of
an election contest should the proposal be adopted.137

Indeed, Dotson subsequently brought a post-election challenge to the
ballot title of the constitutional amendment, which was approved by voters in
August 2014.138 A similar challenge has been brought against the right-tofarm amendment, which will be discussed in Part II.D.
In Dotson’s post-election ballot title challenge, the Supreme Court of
Missouri explicitly confirmed what it had only intimated before: that ballot
titles may be challenged post-election.139 For such a challenge, the vote will
only be overturned if there is an election irregularity of the kind discussed in
Part II.B.2. Although the court did hear Dotson’s claim on the merits, it ultimately did not find that his claim met this standard.140 In Dotson’s case, the
court held that the ballot title was sufficient and fair, with no election irregularity and no new election called for.141
By retaining the same standard applied to other post-election challenges
– that of “irregularities of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on the validity of
the election” – most post-election ballot title challenges will likely go the way
of Dotson and be upheld. But the court’s opinion in Dotson is an open invitation for a disgruntled voter to attempt to overturn any measure when it
doesn’t go his or her way. In the words of Judge Laura Denvir Stith, it also
“invites sandbagging – waiting to see if a measure passes and only challenging the ballot title if the measure does pass, when it is too late to correct the
ballot title.”142 It seems to create more problems than it might address, as
will be discussed in Part IV.

137. Id. at 645 (emphasis added) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 115.555 (2000); State
ex rel. Brown v. Shaw, 129 S.W.3d 372, 374 n.2 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (“After the
six-week deadline of section 115.125.2, judicial relief is limited to an election contest.”).
138. Docket Summaries, SUP. CT. MO. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.courts.mo.gov/
SUP/index.nsf/fe8feff4659e0b7b8625699f0079eddf/2a7a6f05e839fc0d86257dab006f
4387?OpenDocument.
139. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 199 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
141. Id. Judge Teitelman would have called for a new election. Id. at 215–16
(Teitelman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
142. Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)
(Stith, J., dissenting).
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C. Substantive Challenges to Missouri Legislatively-Referred
Constitutional Amendments
Beyond procedural challenges to constitutional amendment elections
and enactments, amendments can also be challenged based on content.143
Such substantive challenges are typically brought post-election, as will be
discussed below.

1. Pre-Election Substantive Challenges
While Missouri provides strict procedural rules and challenges for constitutional amendments before their enactment, there is little authority for the
substantive, pre-enactment judicial review of a constitutional amendment’s
content.144 In Missouri’s seminal case on election law, State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the secretary of state’s
authority to review initiative petitions did not include reviews for unconstitutionality.145 Chapter 116 challenges relate to the legal sufficiency of a proposed constitutional amendment – and this legal sufficiency is used only in
the sense of meeting legal procedural requirements.146 Similarly, judicial
review under a Chapter 115 election contest evaluates “irregularity,” or problems in the process, not problems in the constitutionality of the substantive
proposed provision.147 As the court stated in Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick: “[A]t
no place in either the Missouri Constitution or in the implementing statutes is
any court granted the power to enjoin an amendment from being placed on
the ballot upon the ground that it would be unconstitutional if passed and
adopted by the voters.”148

143. See infra Part II.C.1.
144. These might be brought as declaratory judgment petitions. City of Kan. City

v. Chastain, 420 S.W.3d 550 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). Or perhaps writs of prohibition
or mandamus. State ex rel. City of El Dorado Springs v. Holman, 363 S.W.2d 552
(Mo. 1962) (en banc).
145. State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 130 S.W. 689, 696 (Mo. 1910).
146. See id. (Graves, J., concurring) (describing the secretary of state’s job as
“ministerial,” that is, without discretion, so that the secretary of state does not have
the discretion to, for example, evaluate that substance of the provision); Theodore,
supra note 54.
147. See MO. REV. STAT. § 115.583, .593 (2000); see also Brief of the State, supra
note 122, at *15.
148. 615 S.W.2d 6, 11–12 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). See also State v. Burns, 172
S.W.2d 259, 265–66 (Mo. 1943) (holding that available challenges to a proposed
amendment will not reach any substantive defects in the proposed amendment, but are
preliminary and go only to the procedural errors in proposing it); Moore v. Brown,
165 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Mo. 1942) (en banc).
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Thus, it is entirely possible for states to vote on and pass “unconstitutional” constitutional amendments.149 Under the doctrine of preemption, the
state constitutional amendment must still comply with the federal constitution.150 But justiciability doctrines make prospective review of a state constitutional amendment problematic. Teresa Stanton Collett, a professor at the
University of St. Thomas School of Law wrote:
Evaluation of the constitutionality of an amendment based on the likely consequences of its enactment . . . requires courts to consider all
possible applications and weigh their relative merits. Such a process
requires a much broader base of evidence and is inherently speculative; as a result, it is more likely to provoke claims of judicial activism
or politicization.151

Therefore, substantive challenges to the constitutional amendment before its adoption are not typically viable. The Supreme Court of Missouri
said it this way: “Courts do not sit in judgment on the wisdom or folly of
proposals. Neither will courts give advisory opinions as to whether a particular proposal would, if adopted, violate some superseding fundamental law,
such as the U.S. Constitution.”152
But Article I, Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution only permits citizens to amend the constitution on the condition that “such change be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States,”153 and Missouri has allowed an exception to the general rule against pre-election substantive challenges.154 In Knight v. Carnahan, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District addressed “the propriety of the trial court’s pre-election dismissal of substantive constitutional claims as an issue capable of repetition
yet avoiding review.”155 It held that Missouri courts may review allegations
that a proposed constitutional amendment is “facially unconstitutional.”156
149. Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age
of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 327–31
(2010).
150. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution mandates that it “shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST.
art. VI.
151. Collett, supra note 149, at 342.
152. Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824 (Mo.
1990) (en banc). See also Cures Without Cloning v. Pund, 259 S.W.3d 76 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2008) (regarding free speech and equal protection challenges to a ballot’s summary statement, brought under both state and federal constitutions, where the court
held that constitutional claims were not ripe for consideration), holding modified by
Seay v. Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
153. MO. CONST. art. I, § 3.
154. Knight v. Carnahan, 282 S.W.3d 9, 21–22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
155. Id. at 21.
156. Union Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
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This means, “[T]he constitutional violation in a proposed measure is so obvious as to constitute a matter of form.”157 But this is a very high standard to
meet. Precedent suggests that if the asserted unconstitutionality is facially
apparent, it will not be “debatable.”158 Missouri courts, while holding that
this is a possible claim, have never upheld such a claim.

2. Post-election Substantive Challenges
Post-election substantive challenges,159 on the other hand, have occasionally met with success.160 For example, in 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck one Missouri constitutional amendment in
its entirety,161 holding that it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, the Speech and Debate Clause, the Qualifications Clause, and
Article V of the U.S. Constitution.162 Still, post-election substantive challengers also carry a heavy burden. If “the people have demonstrated their
will” by adopting the amendment, courts will “seek to uphold it if possible.”163
In reviewing a constitutional challenge to a constitutional amendment,
courts will uphold the amendment “over a provision of the constitution or
earlier amendment inconsistent therewith, since an amendment to the constitution becomes a part of the fundamental law, and its operation and effect
cannot be limited or controlled by previous constitutions or laws that may be
in conflict with it.”164 The courts will seek to “give effect, if at all possible,
to the will of the people in passing the amendments.”165

157. Carnahan, 282 S.W.3d at 21 (citing State ex rel. Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon
Comm. v. Klos, 35 S.W.3d 457, 468–69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)).
158. Carnahan, 282 S.W.3d at 22.
159. These might be brought as § 1983 claims or declaratory judgment claims.
Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999) (prospective congressional candidate
brought § 1983 action against Missouri Secretary of State, challenging constitutionality of initiative amending Missouri Constitution), aff’d, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
160. See, e.g., Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project v. Holden, 959 S.W.2d
100 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 17 (Mo. 1981) (en
banc); (Rendlen, J., dissenting); Household Finance Corp. v. Shaffner, 203 S.W.2d
734 (Mo. 1947) (en banc).
161. Gralike, 191 F.3d at 911 (holding that the Court of Appeals would not sever
the unconstitutional portions but strike the amendment in its entirety, as severance
would require micromanagement entangling the Court of Appeals in state law issues).
162. See id.; see also Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir.1999).
163. Buchanan, 615 S.W.2d at 12.
164. State ex rel. Bd. of Fund Comm’rs v. Holman, 296 S.W.2d 482, 491 (Mo.
1956) (en banc).
165. Barnes v. Bailey, 706 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
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D. Challenges to the Right-to-Farm Amendment
This broad framework for election contests and other challenges to legislatively-referred constitutional amendments was applicable to the right-tofarm amendment before and after its enactment. As a legislatively-referred
constitutional amendment, it was not susceptible to the challenges for initiative petitions.166 But the only pre-election challenge available to the amendment, the ballot title challenge under Missouri Revised Statutes Section
115.190, was not brought either. Instead, because of the narrow margin of
defeat in the election, Wes Shoemyer sought a recount under Section
115.601.167 When the recount confirmed the amendment’s enactment, Shoemyer, along with others, filed a post-election challenge seeking a new election.168 In the wake of Dotson, decided only a few months earlier, Shoemyer
alleged that the Supreme Court of Missouri had jurisdiction to hear a postelection challenge to a constitutional amendment’s ballot title.169 This raised
the novel issue before the Supreme Court of Missouri whether this kind of
review, without any pre-election action as in Dotson, was permissible.170
The ballot title for the right-to-farm amendment read: “Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to ensure that the right of Missouri citizens to
engage in agricultural production and ranching practices shall not be infringed?”171 Shoemyer argued that the summary statement of the amendment’s ballot title was “unfair, insufficient, deceptive, and misleading” because it “omitted a significant limitation of the right to farm (legislation by
local government) and incorrectly stated the class of persons who benefitted
from the newly-created right.”172 This, Shoemyer alleged, “caused irregularities in the results”173 of the election.174
Specifically, Shoemyer argued that the ballot title did not inform voters
of the limitation on the right to farm contained in the amendment’s language:175 the right to farm would be “subject to . . . the powers, if any, conferred by article VI.”176 Shoemyer asserted that this omission misled voters
166. See supra Part II.A.
167. Intervenor Mo. Farmers Care Response Brief, supra note 44, at *6.
168. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52,

at *9.
169. Id. at *7.
170. See Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Mo. 2015) (en

banc) (Stith, J., dissenting).
171. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52,
at *8.
172. Id. at *13.
173. Curiously, this is the standard for demanding a recount, and not a new election. See supra notes 107 and 126 and accompanying text.
174. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52,
at *13.
175. Id. at *17.
176. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35.
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“to believe that the right to farm would be protected from any infringement
whatsoever . . . .”177
Additionally, he argued that the ballot title deceived voters by stating
that the right-to-farm amendment would grant rights to Missouri citizens
“when it actually provides rights only to ‘farmers and ranchers.’”178 He cited
political opponents of the amendment who suggested “the terms ‘farmers and
ranchers’ are broad enough to include any entity that is engaging in farming
or ranching in the state of Missouri regardless of their state or country of residency.”179
However, Shoemyer did not present evidence of any voter irregularities
beyond the language of the ballot title and arguments about why it would fail
under the pre-election standards.180 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that
the ballot title language was sufficient and fair and that there were no election
irregularities, and held the results of the election and the validity of the provision.181
Having failed on procedural election challenges, the only other alternatives remaining for Dotson, or others opposing the amendment, would be
substantive ones. Dotson’s petition for a new election included a constitutional challenge to Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.593,182 which
might have an impact on the pending challenge to the right-to-farm amendment under that statute. In Shoemyer’s right-to-farm challenge, the State
seemed to suggest that Section 115.555 is unconstitutional, which would only
have the effect of upholding the election and nullifying the election contest.183
Aside from constitutional challenges to the election statutes, substantive
challenges may be brought against the amendment’s content.184 An affected
citizen might challenge the right-to-farm amendment as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if, for example, farmers
receive some privilege under this amendment that other classifications of
people do not. However, under federal constitutional jurisprudence, this
would receive rational-basis scrutiny and would likely fail.185 Additionally,
an affected citizen might challenge the right-to-farm amendment as violative
177. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52,

at *17.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *18.
180. See Brief of the State, supra note 122, at *18 (“The only supposed ‘evidence’

of irregularities submitted by the Plaintiffs was the bare summary statement of the
ballot title.”).
181. Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 175 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
182. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Petition for Election Challenge, supra note 52,
at *26.
183. Id. at *28 (“Contestees essentially argue that § 115.555 is unconstitutional as
it applies to elections on Constitutional Amendments.”).
184. City of Kan. City v. Chastain, 420 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
185. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 642 n.1 (1996).
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of the Takings Clause if, for example, it allowed a farmer’s property to create
a constructive takings through nuisance.186 This might be successful as applied to a certain situation, but would likely not result in the amendment’s
being stricken wholesale, given its broad language.
It seems that the right-to-farm amendment, having been upheld on all
procedural challenges, is here to stay. It would likely not fail the kind of facial substantive challenge that would remove it from the constitution. And
the Supreme Court of Missouri has affirmed on numerous occasions the authority of a state to “adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”187 The question
then becomes how Missouri courts review challenges not to the amendment,
but arising from it.

III. HOW MISSOURI COURTS REVIEW CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS
The overarching rule of interpretation for a Missouri constitutional provision is that, while “every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common-sense meaning,”188 it “should
never be construed to work confusion and mischief unless no other reasonable construction is possible.”189
The Supreme Court of Missouri has established that its method of constitutional construction is essentially one of broad statutory construction.
Constitutional provisions “are subject to the same rules of construction as
other laws, except that constitutional provisions are given a broader construction due to their more permanent character.”190 Just as statutory interpretation looks to legislative intent, the court’s analysis of constitutional amendments has emphasized the intent of the drafters: “[A] court must undertake to
ascribe to the words of a constitutional provision the meaning that the people
understood them to have when the provision was adopted.”191
There have been some recent debates, however, as to what this “broad
statutory construction,” coupled with deference to drafter-intent, looks like in
186. See, e.g., Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors in & for Kossuth Cty., 584 N.W.2d
309 (Iowa 1998) (holding that nuisance immunity provision in agricultural land
preservation statute was unconstitutional).
187. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982); PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
188. Akin v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 956 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Mo.1997) (en banc)
(quoting State ex inf. Dalton v. Dearing, 263 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Mo. 1954) (en banc)).
189. Theodoro v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 527 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1975) (en
banc) (citing State ex rel. Moore v. Tobermanm, 250 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1952) (en
banc)).
190. Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by King-Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist., 361 S.W.3d
414 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
191. Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
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practice. Missouri’s first Constitution was drafted in 1820 and underwent a
series of revisions in its first hundred years of existence.192 The current Missouri Constitution is the result of a 1943–1944 constitutional convention and
was formally adopted in 1945.193 In American Federation of Teachers v.
Ledbetter, the Supreme Court of Missouri construed a 1945 constitutional
amendment protecting the right of teachers to meet and bargain collectively.194 The court examined debates of the 1943–1944 constitutional convention, the “American history” of the particular term at issue, and the statutory
interpretations of the term at the time it was adopted.195 It reached the result
that this constitutional right included a corresponding duty on the part of the
school board to meet with teachers.196
For the purposes of interpreting state constitutional amendments submitted to popular vote after 1945,197 Missouri seems to have adopted a similar
constitutional analysis: “[T]he primary rule is to ‘give effect to the intent of
the voters who adopted the Amendment’ by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the word.”198 The plain and ordinary meaning is “that meaning which the people commonly understood the words to have when the provision was adopted.”199 To determine this, the court will look to the meaning
found in the dictionary.200
The court has reasoned that it cannot determine voters’ intent “if a word
has more than one dictionary definition that applies in the context of the provision.”201 If there is “duplicity, indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of
an expression,” the constitutional amendment is ambiguous.202 To resolve
192. See William F. Swindler, Missouri Constitutions: History, Theory and Practice, 23 MO. L. REV. 32 (1958).
193. William F. Swindler, Missouri Constitutions: History, Theory and Practice
(continued),
FACULTY
PUBLICATIONS,
Paper
1617,
157
(1958),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2632&context=facpubs.
194. 387 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
195. Id. at 364–64.
196. Id. at 367. However, the dissent to this opinion emphasized the amendment’s plain language and referred to previous interpretations of the constitutional
provision as reaching an opposite result. Id. at 370 (Fisher, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the principal opinion raised serious separation of power concerns,
that it could not rely on changes to the term at issue that were enacted by statutes, and
that it could not change terms “by judicial mandate based on a judicial philosophy
that changes the meaning of a state constitutional provision over time.” Id.
197. This is when Missouri last held its constitutional convention. Swindler,
supra note 192.
198. Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 25 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Keller v.
Marion Cty. Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)).
199. Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
200. StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar, 208 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo. 2006) (en
banc).
201. Johnson, 366 S.W.3d at 25.
202. J.B. Vending Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 54 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Mo. 2001) (en
banc) (quoting Lehr v. Collier, 909 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
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any ambiguity in a constitutional provision, the court will apply rules of statutory interpretation.203 Ultimately, then, the interpretation of both the original
constitutional text and post-1945 amendments are methodically the same, but
one looks to the “drafters’” intent, while the other looks to the “voters’” intent. Both rely on plain and ordinary meaning, using dictionary definitions
to determine intended meaning and, in cases of ambiguity, default to the canons of statutory construction.204
Finally, all state constitutional provisions are “‘preempted and have no
effect’ to the extent they conflict with federal laws.”205 They must therefore
be interpreted to comply with, for example, the Equal Protection Clause, and
all other provisions of the U.S. Constitution, and with all provisions of, for
example, federal environmental regulations.

A. Probable Interpretations of the Right-to-Farm Amendment
By understanding Missouri’s broad constitutional interpretory framework, one can make some reasonable conjectures about how Missouri courts
might interpret the recently adopted right-to-farm amendment.

1. “Agriculture”
As a preliminary matter, it must be determined what exactly the voters
intended to protect when they enacted this language – or rather, what the
courts will likely determine the voters intended to protect by this language.
The plain and ordinary meaning of “agriculture” is: “The science or art
of cultivating soil, harvesting crops, and raising livestock.”206 Typically,
“agriculture” is understood as encompassing more than “farming.”207 As
stated in Black’s Law Dictionary: “[W]hile [agriculture] includes the preparation of soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and all
their incidents, it also includes gardening, horticulture,208 viticulture,209 dairying, poultry, bee raising, and ranching.”210
203. Johnson, 366 S.W.3d at 26.
204. Howard v. City of Kan. City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 787 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)

(quoting Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo.
2009) (en banc)).
205. Johnson, 366 S.W.3d at 26–27 (quoting State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina, 320
S.W.3d 145, 148 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)).
206. Agriculture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (10th ed. 2014).
207. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agriculture § 1.
208. Horticulture, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (“The cultivation of a
garden; the art or science of cultivating or managing gardens, including the growing
of flowers, fruits, and vegetables.”).
209. Viticulture, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (“The cultivation of the
vine; vine-growing” – i.e., to produce grapes and wine).
210. Agriculture, supra note 206; see also St. Louis Rose Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Comm’n, 159 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1941) (construing horticulture as agriculture).
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Indeed, the Missouri legislature’s definition of “agricultural products”
has become increasingly inclusive. Missouri Revised Statutes Section
265.010, enacted in 1939 and last amended in 1949, deals with the regulation
and marketing of agricultural products.211 These are defined to “include horticultural, viticultural, dairy, bee, and any farm product.”212 In 1982, the legislature enacted Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.295, the right-to-farm
statute discussed above.213 As used in that section, the term agricultural operation included “any facility used in the production or processing for commercial purposes of crops, livestock, swine, poultry, livestock products,
swine products, or poultry products.”214 In 2013, the legislature enacted the
most inclusive language yet, defining an “agricultural product” for purposes
of urban agricultural zones in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 262.900 as:
[A]n agricultural, horticultural, viticultural, or vegetable product,
growing of grapes that will be processed into wine, bees, honey, fish
or other aquacultural product, planting seed, livestock, a livestock
product, a forestry product, poultry or a poultry product, either in its
natural or processed state, that has been produced, processed, or otherwise had value added to it in this state. 215

Similarly, Title XVII of the Missouri Revised Statutes, “Agriculture and
Animals,” has come to include chapters on agritourism, apiaries, pesticides,
seeds, stockyards, grain, poultry, livestock, and treated timber products.216
Livestock includes not only cattle, swine, sheep, equine, goats, and poultry,
but also “ostrich and emu, aquatic products . . . llamas, alpaca, buffalo, elk . .
.217 and exotic animals.”218
The terms of the constitutional amendment, however, are narrower than
general “agriculture” and protect only “[t]hat agriculture which provides
food, energy, health benefits, and security.”219 For example, although greenhouses for the production and sale of roses and other flowers have been held
to be agricultural in Missouri courts,220 they probably would not be protected
under this amendment.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

MO. REV. STAT. § 265.010 (2000).
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000).
Id.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 262.900 (West 2016).
MO. STAT. tit. XVII, chs. 262, 264, 266, 276, 277, 280, and 281.
Elk are livestock insofar as they are “documented as obtained from a legal
source and not from the wild and raised in confinement for human consumption or
animal husbandry.” MO. REV. STAT. § 277.020 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
218. Id.
219. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35.
220. St. Louis Rose Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n, 159 S.W.2d 249, 249,
250–51 (Mo 1941).
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Crops that are grown for food and livestock, including fisheries, would
obviously be protected under this amendment. This would include largescale, confined animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”)221 and also extend to
those operations raising exotic animals or elk and buffalo for the purposes of
human consumption. This might also include someone’s backyard garden
that produces food, though as will be discussed below, there may be some
economic contribution threshold before such an operation would be protected
by this statute.
This probably does not include the procurement of food through hunting
or gathering, as the statutory language and plain meaning of agriculture entails preparation and not just collection. That is, it would protect the raising
of cattle and growing of crops, and not just the harvest of them. Therefore,
an operation that hunts wild elk and sells their meat would not be included in
this framework, but an operation that raises domesticated elk and sells their
meat would likely be.222

2. “Farmers and Ranchers”
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “farmer” is somewhat circular, referring most plainly to one who engages in farming.223 Black’s Law
Dictionary defines it specifically as “a person whose business is farming.”224
Missouri’s statutory definitions related to the term “farmer” operate, unsurprisingly, on the assumption that a farmer is one who runs a farm.225 Thus,
“farm” is the term that requires more investigation here.
The Supreme Court of Missouri reasoned that one who produced farm
products was a farmer.226 Missouri Agricultural Statistics Services defines
farms as places with $1000 or more in annual sales of agricultural products.227 However, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 288.034’s definition of

221. McGuire v. Kenoma, LLC, 375 S.W.3d 157, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Bd.
of Dirs. of Richland Twp. v. Kenoma, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
222. MO. REV. STAT. § 277.020 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
223. Farmer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 723 (10th ed. 2014).
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 150.030, 350.010 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 348.500,
288.034 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
226. Kan. City v. Rosehill Gardens, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Mo. 1976) (en
banc) (“We have concluded that defendant is a ‘farmer’ and a producer of ‘farm
products’ in growing products classified both as horticultural and floracultural [sic] as
well as bedding plants. We see no logical reason why a definition of farm products
should be limited to products that can be consumed by either human beings or animals.”), overruled by Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907 (Mo.
1997) (en banc).
227. Mo. Econ. Research & Info. Ctr., supra note 21.
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“agricultural labor” contemplates farms that are not operated for profit.228
Ultimately, then, a farmer seems to be involved in introducing some sort of
agricultural product to the market, whether or not the farm is operated for
profit, and thus might include an individual’s backyard garden.229
On the other end of the spectrum, large corporations would probably be
included as “farmers.” Missouri has a corporate farm statute that limits the
ability of corporations to operate farms in some circumstances – but its exceptions are quite inclusive.230 It allows “family farm corporations” or corporations incorporated for the purpose of owning and farming agricultural land,
to farm so long as at least one-half of the stockholders in the company are
members of a family related to each other within the third degree (including
spouses), the family members own at least one-half of the stock, and one of
the family members resides on or actively operates the farm.231 It also allows
“authorized farm corporations”: a corporation comprised of shareholders who
are all “natural persons,” not further corporations or organizations, and which
receives two thirds or more of its net income from farming.232 Indeed, regardless of this statute, the broadness afforded to constitutional provisions
might mean that this term includes any corporation that produces farm products.
Similarly, “ranchers” are, plainly, those who engage in ranching, and
thus the term “ranching” requires more inquiry.233 A ranch is typically understood as “a large farm or estate for breeding cattle, horses, or sheep.”234
Missouri offers no real statutory guidance on who ranchers might be,235 or on
what “ranching” entails.
Opponents of the amendment expressed concern that the right to farm
for “farmers and ranchers,” as opposed to “Missouri citizens,” would privilege foreign corporations who own or operate farms or ranches in Missouri.236 At present, a Missouri statute limits foreign ownership of agricultur228. It defines agricultural labor as one of five different possibilities of working
on “farms,” and only one possibility includes working “on a farm operated for profit.”
MO. REV. STAT. § 288.034(12)(1)(a)(e) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
229. See Table 1. Historical Highlights: 2012 and Earlier Census Years, supra
note 15. Indeed, a number of traditional farmers are turning to second, off-farm jobs.
Id.
230. MO. REV. STAT. § 350.015 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
231. MO. REV. STAT. § 350.010(5) (2000).
232. Id. § 350.010(6).
233. Ranch, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE.
234. Id.
235. Though some statutes apply to “farm or ranch” alike. MO. REV. STAT. §§
135.679, 348.015, 578.005 (Cum. Supp. 2013). One Missouri case discussed a “wild
game ranch.” High Adventure Game Ranch, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 824 S.W.2d
905, 905 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
236. See, e.g., Chris Kardish, Missouri’s ‘Right-to-Farm’ Vote Isn’t as Simple as
it Sounds, GOVERNING (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/
transportation-infrastructure/gov-right-to-farm-missouri-ballot.html.
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al land to one percent of the total agricultural acreage in the state.237 Under
this statute, a foreign business is one in which a controlling interest is owned
by people who are not citizens or residents of the United States.238 But while
the statute only refers to ownership of land, it would prevent a foreign business from repurposing existing land to use agriculturally once that one percent limit is met.239 This would seem a clear legislative infringement on the
right of farmers and ranchers in Missouri. It is possible that a Missouri court
might uphold the statute under the new right-to-farm amendment. In looking
at the intent of voters, the court may consider the ballot title language describing the right of “Missouri citizens” to farm and ranch.240 But this might
not overcome the clear arguments the other way.

3. Duly Authorized Powers
Perhaps the most intriguing language of the amendment is its limitation
that provides the right to farm is “subject to duly authorized powers, if any,
conferred by Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri.”241 The right-tofarm amendment is the only section in the Bill of Rights, and in the Missouri
Constitution for that matter, that includes this limitation. It will most probably be interpreted to mean that the right to farm is subject to local government but not the legislature.
Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri establishes local government:
counties, cities, and other municipal organizations.242 Counties are classified
as first-, second-, or third-class based on their property values.243 Counties,
cities, and other municipal organizations may enact local ordinances, but this
237. MO. ANN. STAT. § 442.571 (West 2016). But a recent bill effectively creates
a loophole to the one percent limitation, only requiring real estate transactions to be
submitted to the director of the department of agriculture “if there is no completed
Internal Revenue Service Form W-9 signed by the purchaser.” S. 12, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (amending § 442.571). In other words, foreign corporations can purchase agricultural land through American subsidiaries, circumventing
regulation because state regulators’ approval is no longer necessary.
238. MO. REV. STAT. § 442.566(2), (5) (2000).
239. Id. § 442.591.
240. H.R.J. Res. Nos. 11 & 7, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013),
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills131/billpdf/commit/HJR0011C.PDF.
241. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. For a legal analysis of this phrase, which was of
great value to the analysis here, see David Cosgrove, Legal Analysis of Missouri
Right to Farm Constitutional Amendment 1 (HJ Res. Nos. 11 & 7), COSGROVE L.
GROUP, LLC,
http://cosgrovelawllc.com/legal-analysis-of-missouri-right-to-farm-constitutionalamendment-1-hj-res-nos-11-7/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
242. MO. CONST. art. VI.
243. See MO. REV. STAT. § 48.010 (2000) (“‘[A]ssessed valuation’ shall mean the
valuation of all real and personal property as determined and finally established by
the state agency charged with the duty of equalizing assessments.”); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 48.020 (Cum. Supp. 2013).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 20

236

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

power is limited by the legislature through the Dillon rule.244 This rule was
first stated in 1868 by Iowa’s Supreme Court Chief Justice John Dillon,245
and it essentially limits municipalities’ power to act absent existing statutory
authority.246
Current legislation restricts counties’ abilities to enact ordinances regulating agricultural operations. For example, under Missouri Revised Statutes
Section 64.620, second- and third-class counties are authorized to impose
building restrictions, excluding farm buildings or structures.247 Similar provisions are found in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 64.890, which exempt
building and land-use restrictions of alternative counties from applying to
“the raising of crops, livestock, orchards or forestry.”248 Additionally, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 49.650 gives first-class counties authority to
adopt ordinances, including for nuisance abatement, but excluding agricultural property.249 It also authorizes counties to enact ordinances for storm water
control – but again excludes agricultural properties from this provision.250
Finally, Section 49.650.5 forbids third-class counties from enacting any new
ordinances relating to agricultural operations.251 Charter counties,252 on the
other hand, are not so limited. They may enact any ordinance that does not
conflict with state law.253

244. See Cosgrove, supra note 241. See also Christian Cty. v. Edward D. Jones &
Co., 200 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Babb v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
414 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Damon v. City of Kan. City, No. WD 75363,
2013 WL 6170565 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013); State v. Ostdiek, 315 S.W.3d 758
(Mo. Ct. App. 2011); Borron v. Farrenkopf, 5 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
245. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
246. Kenneth D. Dean, Comment, The Dillon Rule – a Limit on Local Government Powers, 41 MO. L. REV. 546, 546–47 (1976).
247. MO. REV. STAT. § 64.020 (2000).
248. Id. § 64.890. An “alternative county” is defined in statute:
The county commission of any county of the first class not having a charter
form of government, or of any county of the second, third or fourth class may,
after approval by vote of the people of the county, create a county planning
commission to prepare a county plan for all areas of the county outside the
corporate limits of any city, town or village which has adopted a city plan in
accordance with the laws of this state.

Id. § 64.800.1.
249. MO. REV. STAT. § 49.650.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
250. Id. § 49.650.1(4).
251. Id. § 49.650.5.
252. The only charter counties are Jackson, Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. Louis
counties. Cosgrove, supra note 241.
253. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a); see also Barber v. Jackson Cty. Ethics Comm’n,
935 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
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The legislature has given cities and towns more authority to regulate agricultural operations.254 It has authorized third- and fourth-class cities to enact any ordinance not in conflict with federal and state laws.255 It has prohibited townships, however, from creating regulations “with respect to the erection, maintenance, repair, alteration or extension of farm buildings or farm
structures.”256 Missouri courts have consistently enforced this provision,
striking down township zoning ordinances related to CAFOs’ buildings and
structures.257
When it comes to health and safety regulations, however, counties are
authorized to make “orders, ordinances, rules or regulations . . . as will tend
to enhance the public health and prevent the entrance of infectious, contagious, communicable or dangerous diseases into such county.”258 These local
regulations are superseded by state health rules and regulations, but they are
not limited with reference to agriculture.259 A farm challenged a county ordinance created under this statute, and the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District upheld it as being “rationally related” to public health.260
This merely reflects the current state of affairs. The legislature can always amend these statutes, or it can enact new statutes granting local governments more powers. But if history is any indication, there have only been
attempts to further limit counties’ abilities to enact health regulations.261
There have been no recent attempts to relax these limitations or otherwise
expand local governments’ powers.
At the same time, the specific language of the amendment seems to imply that it is only subject to regulation by local governments under Article VI:
the right to farm is “subject to duly authorized powers, if any, conferred by
article VI of the Constitution of Missouri,”262 with no additional limitations.
Traditional statutory interpretation would render any other construal probably

254.
255.
256.
257.

Cosgrove, supra note 241.
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 77.590, 79.110 (2000).
Id. § 65.677 (emphasis added).
See Cosgrove, supra note 241 (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Richland Twp. v. Kenoma, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v.
Lincoln Twp. of Putnam Cty., 946 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)).
258. MO. REV. STAT. § 192.300 (2000).
259. Id.
260. Borron v. Farrenkopf, 5 S.W.3d 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); see also Milton
Const. & Supply Co. v. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 352 S.W.2d 685, 692 (Mo. 1961) (en
banc) (“A regulation designed to promote the health and welfare of the people does
not infringe on constitutional guaranties of personal rights and due process ‘unless the
regulation passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of arbitrary power.”).
261. See, e.g., S. 364, 94th Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007); H.C.S.
S.C.S. S. 692 (Mo. 2012); H.C.S. S.C.S. S. 9, H.C.S. S. 342 (Mo. 2013); H.R. 1728
(Mo. 2014); H.R. 2210 (Mo. 2014).
262. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35; see also Cosgrove, supra note 241.
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against the plain and ordinary meaning of the provision.263 Therefore, it will
probably not be subject to Article III of the Missouri Constitution – regulation by the legislature. Although the legislature would have the power to
expand or restrict local governments’ abilities to regulate farmers’ and ranchers’ right to farm, it seems it would have no ability to compel the enactment
of an ordinance if a local government chose simply not to regulate farmers
and ranchers in a certain way.

B. Implications of the Right-to-Farm Amendment’s Placement in the
Bill of Rights
The interpretation of the right-to-farm amendment might also be nuanced by its placement in the bill of rights section of the Missouri Constitution, Article I, as opposed to the other articles of that document. The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that provisions in the state constitution’s
bill of rights can grant citizens affirmative rights, imposing affirmative duties.264 In Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield (“Lodge 15”), the court overruled a previous
case, Quinn v. Buchanan.265 It held that Quinn was based on the “erroneous
inference” that “a Bill of Rights, in this case the Missouri ‘Declaration of
Rights’ found in article I of its constitution, does not grant ‘new’ rights; it
merely declares those rights that the people already possess, regardless of
whether they are the subject of a governmental grant.”266
Instead, Lodge 15 affirmed that a bill of rights can grant new rights and
does not merely “declare” existing rights.267 These new rights can give rise
to new, affirmative duties for the state or other parties.268 For example, in
Ledbetter, the court concluded that a constitutional amendment protecting the
263. Cosgrove, supra note 241. Indeed, Cosgrove notes that “if the right were
‘subject to’ laws enacted (or regulations promulgated) pursuant to state and/or local
power, this clause would not be needed.” Id.
264. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield (Lodge 15), 386 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (“Moreover, inclusion
in Missouri’s ‘Declaration of Rights’ does not mean that a provision cannot grant an
affirmative right. The people of Missouri may place anything they wish within their
constitution so long as it is not contrary to the federal constitution.”); see State ex rel.
St. Louis Fire Fighters Ass’n Local No. 73 AFL–CIO v. Stemmler, 479 S.W.2d 456,
458 (Mo. 1972) (en banc) (“[W]hen the people of the State of Missouri write or
amend their constitution, they may insert therein any provision they desire, subject
only to the limitation that it must not violate restrictions which the people have imposed on themselves and on the states by provisions which they have written into the
federal constitution.”).
265. 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957) (en banc), overruled by Lodge 15, 386 S.W.3d
755.
266. Lodge 15, 386 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting Quinn, 298 S.W.2d at 417).
267. Id. at 762.
268. Id.
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right of teachers to meet and bargain collectively implied a corresponding
duty on the part of the school board to meet with teachers.269
Given the Court’s holdings in Lodge 15 and Ledbetter, some might believe that farmers and ranchers would be able to independently assert their
new right to farm – wielding that right as a sword by imposing affirmative
duties on other parties in addition to defensively raising it as a shield when
other parties infringe that right. But the amendment seems to simply “declare” a right that the people already possess. Thus, the only new “right”
might be protection from the legislature. This is made clear when examining
the right to farm against other traditionally recognized rights: the right to
work and the right to use property.

1. The Right to Farm and the Right to Work
Although it does not have a textual basis in either the U.S. or the Missouri constitutions, the right to work at a lawful occupation is an essential
component of liberty.270 Farmers already share in this right.271 Some states’
constitutional jurisprudences have specifically explored and guaranteed this
right,272 and the Supreme Court of the United States has reasoned that “the

Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
Id.
See, e.g., Kafka v. Hagener, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043 (D. Mont. 2001)
(quoting Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (Mont. 1996)) (“The inalienable
right to pursue life’s basic necessities is stated in the Montana Declaration of Rights
and is therefore a fundamental right; while not specifically enumerated in the terms of
Montana’s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right to pursue life’s basic necessities.”); Mont. Cannabis Indus.
Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161 (Mont. 2012) (“While the right to the opportunity to
pursue employment is not specifically enumerated in the Montana Constitution, it is a
fundamental right, because it is a right without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.”); Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1174 (“[T]he right
to the opportunity to pursue employment is itself a fundamental right and is encompassed within the right to pursue life’s basic necessities as declared under Article II,
section 3 of Montana’s constitution. Because the opportunity to work and to make a
living is a fundamental right, it is incumbent upon the state to demonstrate a compelling interest before it may constitutionally infringe upon that right. Necessarily,
demonstrating a compelling interest entails something more than simply saying it is
so.”). See, e.g., McCool v. City of Phila., 494 F. Supp. 2d 307, 328 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(citing Hunter v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 419 A.2d 631, 635 (Pa. 1980)) (“The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as guaranteeing an individual’s right to engage in any of the common occupations of life.”). See, e.g., D’Amico v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 520 P.2d 10, 18 (Cal.
1974) (in bank) (quoting Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971)) (the
right to pursue a lawful occupation is fundamental if the employment sought is a
“common occupations of the community”).
269.
270.
271.
272.
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right to work for a living in the common occupations273 of the community is
of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”274 Indeed, “[T]he right
of an individual to engage in a lawful occupation . . . is embraced within the
constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.”275
At the same time, however, several courts have noted that this right is
not “fundamental,”276 nor does it guarantee the right to a particular occupation277 (except in the limited context of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause,278 when a state restricts the employment opportunities of residents of
other states).279 This general right to pursue a livelihood is subject to regulation, and it may be limited by reasonable measures promoting the general
welfare under the federal constitution.280 Any such occupational regulation is
reviewed under the rational basis standard.281

273. Even if farming and ranching are considered some of these “common occupations,” however, the right to pursue farming or ranching, specifically, is not fundamental or guaranteed. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
274. Truax, 239 U.S. at 41.
275. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 832 (footnotes omitted).
276. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 380 (1979)
(“[T]his Court has never held that the right to any particular private employment is a
‘right of national citizenship,’ or derives from any other right created by the Constitution.”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (“[T]he Court finds
that the right to work is not a fundamental right.”).
277. See Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1989) (for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause, the right to pursue a calling or profession is not a
fundamental right); Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 250 (D. Minn. 1972),
aff’d, 410 U.S. 976 (1973) (employment not a fundamental right protected by Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection); Townsend v. Cty. of L.A., 49 Cal. App. 3d
263, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (there is no fundamental right to work for a particular
employer, public or private).
278. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
279. The Supreme Court has characterized the ability to pursue a particular line of
employment as a fundamental right in the limited context of the privileges and immunities clause, where a state government has attempted to limit employment opportunities to state or municipal residents. Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage
Laws Enf’t Comm’n, 889 F.2d 929, 932 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Supreme Court of
N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279–80 (1985)) (limiting bar admission to state residents)).
280. See, e.g., Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232,
238–39 (1957) (citations omitted) (“A State cannot exclude a person from the practice
of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A State can
require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in
its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a
rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law.”).
281. Id. at 239.
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It might seem that Missouri’s new right-to-farm amendment expands
this general “declarative” right to pursue an occupation to include the particular occupations of farming or ranching. The language of the amendment
protects “the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching
practices,”282 and any citizen engaging in farming or ranching practices is, at
least based on Missouri’s judicial history,283 a farmer or rancher. This may
not extend, however, to those who are not already farmers or ranchers or who
do not have the means to become so. By this language, a citizen does not
have the right to “become” a farmer or rancher, or to begin to engage in farming or ranching practices. Instead, those who otherwise exercise their general
right to pursue a livelihood and lawfully become farmers or ranchers are then
protected with a more particular right to continue to pursue that livelihood.
But practically, it does not seem that this would play out. A terminated
farm employee could not compel his employer to keep him on because of his
“right-to-farm.” Nor could a farmer compel her off-the-farm employer to
grant her an extended leave of absence during harvest season because of her
right to bring in crops. Therefore, in terms of farming as an occupation, the
amendment does not seem to grant a “new” right to Missouri citizens who are
or who become ranchers and farmers and does not seem to raise new, corresponding duties. Instead, it would protect farmers from adverse legislation
that would interfere with their right to pursue the occupation of farming,
shielding farmers from such legislation.

2. The Right to Farm and the Right to Use Property
Put another way, the right to farmland seems simply to be a declarative
right in terms of using one’s own property in the manner one would like. A
property owner has the fundamental right to use and enjoy his or her private
property.284 The traditional view is that “[e]very proprietor of land, where
not restrained by covenant or custom, has the entire dominion of the soil and
the space above and below to any extent he may choose to occupy it, and in
this occupation he may use his land according to his own judgment . . . .”285
John Locke considered the protection of private property one of the
most important purposes of government – indeed, the primary reason that
independent beings could feel compelled to subject themselves to the “dominion and control” of government power.286 Thus, property rights have long

282. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (emphasis added).
283. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the definition of “farmer” and “rancher” in

Missouri statutory and judicial history).
284. 2 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 582.5 (3d ed.).
285. Id.
286. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 184, §123 (Thomas I. Cook
ed., Hafner Publishing Co. 1947); see also 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 629
(“[T]he protection of [the right of property] is one of the most important objects of
government. It is said that the right of property lies at the foundation of our constitu-
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been guaranteed at common law, though they are also protected by state and
federal constitutions.287 In the constitutional sense, a “property right” refers
to “the right to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of property.”288 The government cannot take property without adequate justification289 or without just
compensation in the case of eminent domain.290 These constitutional protections “should be liberally construed in favor of the right of property.”291
Thus, property owners have long enjoyed the right to use their property as
they saw fit – including using their property to farm or ranch. Still, this right
has also traditionally been subject to certain usage requirements. For example, even at common law, one could enjoy his or her own property only insofar as it was not a nuisance to another’s property.292 More recently, and especially in the context of state and local government, zoning laws significantly
restrict how property owners may use their property.293
In Missouri, for example, zoning is a local legislative act.294 It is a
county’s or municipality’s legislative body, not the state’s, that has the power
to zone property.295 They have broad discretion, so long as their zoning
“bears a substantial relation to the public welfare.”296 As the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Eastern District explained, “[i]f the public welfare is not
served by the zoning or if the public interest served by the zoning is greatly
outweighed by the detriment to private interests, the zoning is considered to
be arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, violative of [constitutional] due
process . . . .”297
Most constitutional zoning challenges in Missouri, up to this point, have
been brought as constitutional due process challenges.298 However, a challenge under the right-to-farm amendment would not be the first time a Missouri-specific constitutional provision was additionally used to challenge a
zoning ordinance. In 1875, the Missouri Constitution was amended to forbid
not only the “taking” of private property without just compensation, but also
tional government and is necessary to the existence of civil liberty and free institutions, and that such right is essential in our conception of freedom.”).
287. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 742.
288. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 629.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV (Substantive Due Process Clauses).
290. Id. at amend. V.
291. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 845.
292. See, e.g., 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 47.
293. See Stephen L. Kling et al., Zoning As A Tool of Land Use Control an Analysis of the Use of Zoning As A Land Use Control, 64 J. MO. B. 230 (2008).
294. Hoffman v. City of Town & Country, 831 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
see generally State ex rel. Helujon, Ltd. v. Jefferson Cty., 964 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1998).
295. Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (citing MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 89.020–.060 (1969)); see also MO. REV. STAT. ch. 64.
296. Loomstein v. St. Louis Cty., 609 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
297. Id.
298. See, e.g., Hoffman, 831 S.W.2d 223; Allen, 488 S.W.2d at 673.
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“damage to private property without fair compensation.”299 In the 1927 case
of State v. Christopher, plaintiffs argued that even if zoning did not qualify as
an unconstitutional taking under the federal constitution, it did qualify as
damage under Missouri’s constitutional provision.300 The Supreme Court of
Missouri rejected this interpretation.301 It was “unimpressed by the change in
the wording in the 1875 Constitution, dismissing it as an attempt to remedy
an error of construction contained in earlier decisions which had ascribed an
unduly narrow definition to the phrase ‘taking of private property.’”302 The
court conducted traditional due process analysis, and it held that the zoning
ordinance was a “valid exercise” of the state’s police power as it was a “reasonably appropriate means” of accomplishing specific public objectives.303
The test is similar today and probably would not change for the right-tofarm amendment. As a recent article in the Missouri Bar Journal explained,
“[i]n measuring the reasonableness of a zoning regulation, Missouri courts
weigh the benefit to the general public against any private detriment by considering several factors,” including “(i) adaptability of the property to its zoning, (ii) significant reduction in value of the property based upon the zoning,
(iii) incompatibility of the zoning with surrounding uses, and (iv) conformity
of the zoning to the local government’s comprehensive plan.”304
Missouri courts presume that zoning ordinances are valid, meaning that
the challenger must prove that the zoning ordinance is unreasonable.305 In
evaluating the ordinance, courts employ a “fairly debatable” standard of review: “[I]f the reasonableness or constitutionality of a zoning regulation is
fairly debatable, the zoning regulation will stand.”306
Given the amendment’s express limitation to Article VI powers, the
right-to-farm amendment would probably have no effect on these provisions.
Again, the amendment merely protects an existing property right from future,
state legislative infringement.

299. 18 MO. PRAC., REAL ESTATE LAW--TRANSACT. & DISPUTES § 24:3 (3d ed.

2015).
300. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 298 S.W. 720, 725 (Mo.
1927) (en banc).
301. Id.
302. 18 MO. PRAC., supra note 299, at § 24:3. “In view of the foregoing it is clear
that the addition of the word ‘damaged’ to that of ‘taken’ in the eminent domain
clause of our Constitution did not broaden its limitation. The amendment operated to
correct an error of construction and nothing more.” Christopher, 298 S.W.at 723.
303. Christopher, 298 S.W. at 724.
304. Kling et al., supra note 293, at 235.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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C. How the Amendment Might Affect Missouri Law
The principles of preemption that apply at the federal constitutional level are also applicable at the state level in Missouri.307 Therefore, a constitutional amendment can preempt state and local laws.308 In Missouri, a statute
is assumed to be constitutional and will only be held unconstitutional when a
plaintiff proves that it “clearly and undoubtedly contravene[s] the constitution.”309 A court will uphold a statute unless it “plainly and palpably affronts
fundamental law embodied in the constitution,”310 and “[d]oubts will be resolved in favor of the constitutionality” of the statute.311
The right-to-farm amendment may render some existing Missouri statutes unconstitutional as applied to farmers. For example, Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 523.010 allows public utilities to condemn land for the purposes of “the manufacture or transmission of electric current for light, heat or
power . . . .”312 If a public utility company and a farmer could not agree on
the proper compensation to be paid for the farmer’s land in such a case, this
statute would allow the public utility company to condemn the farmer’s property.313 This might very well be construed as “plainly and palpably” affronting the farmer’s right to farm.
Additionally, the statute that allegedly catalyzed the movement toward
this amendment, Proposition B, might also be affected.314 It is difficult to
know exactly how because the amendment does not include a standard of
review. For example, another bill of rights provision recently passed in Missouri states that gun laws will be subject to strict scrutiny.315 The right-to307. See id.
308. See id.
309. Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys v. Barton Cty., 311 S.W.3d 737, 740–41 (Mo. 2010)

(en banc). See St. Louis Cty. v. Prestige Travel, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Mo.
2011) (en banc).
310. Barton Cty., 311 S.W.3d at 741 (quoting United C.O.D. v. State, 150 S.W.3d
311, 313 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)).
311. Id. (quoting Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys & Circuit Att’ys Ret. Sys. v. Pemiscot
Cty., 256 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Mo. 2008) (en banc)).
312. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.010 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (“[F]or the manufacture or
transmission of electric current for light, heat or power, including the construction,
when that is the case, of necessary dams and appurtenant canals, flumes, tunnels and
tailraces and including the erection, when that is the case, of necessary electric steam
powerhouses, hydroelectric powerhouses and electric substations or any oil, pipeline
or gas corporation engaged in the business of transporting or carrying oil, liquid fertilizer solutions, or gas by means of pipes or pipelines laid underneath the surface of
the ground, or other corporation created under the laws of this state for public use . . .
.”).
313. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 228.342 (2000) (giving landowners right to
seek widening of other’s private road).
314. MO. REV. STAT. § 273.345 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (the “Canine cruelty prevention act”).
315. MO. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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farm amendment provides no such guidance. On the one hand, the Missouri
courts might defer to the legislature, as any doubts about whether farmers can
still farm while treating their animals poorly would be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the statute. On the other hand, the courts might well say
that what is currently animal abuse falls within the purview of “farming and
ranching practices” and strike these and other provisions down as applied to
farmers and ranchers.316
However, where public health is involved, statutes may still be upheld
even if they require farmers and ranchers to farm or ranch in a particular way.
For example, farmers will probably be required to continue to dispose of dead
animals in the same way and to quarantine sick animals.317 Similarly, where
state inspection is required and certain standards must be met before putting
farm products on the market for human consumption, the right to farm would
probably not supersede.318 Where the public benefit is not so clear, however,
such as Missouri Revised Statutes Section 266.430’s requirement that farmers
cook garbage before feeding it to swine, farmers might win a challenge.319
Additionally, the amendment will likely broaden the statutory protections already in place for nuisance. Missouri has had a “right-to-farm” statute
since 1982, which essentially designates farms as “permanent” nuisances,
protected from public or private nuisance claims.320 It allows them reasonable expansion without fear of new nuisance suits.321 For more dramatic expansion, this statute effectively creates a twelve-month statute of limitations
from the time any new operation began that might change conditions for surrounding properties.322 This essentially immunizes farmers from nuisance
claims if none are filed within one year.323 Any agricultural operation that

316. See also MO. REV. STAT. § 578.013 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (relating to videotapes or digital recording of farm animal abuse or neglect).
317. MO. REV. STAT. § 267.590 (2000) (required quarantine of animal or herd by
state veterinarian); MO. REV. STAT. § 577.076 (2000) (penalty for littering with carcasses); MO. ANN. STAT. § 577.076 (West 2016) (effective Jan. 1, 2017) (penalty for
the unlawful disposition of a dead animal).
318. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 196.935 (2000) (requiring the pasteurization of
milk before selling to public, but allowing direct sales of raw, unpasteurized milk).
319. MO. REV. STAT. § 266.430 (2000) (requiring a permit for feeding livestock
garbage).
320. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000) (enacted 1982, amended 1990); Fact
Sheet, Right-to-Farm Laws, AM. FARMLAND TRUST (Sept. 1998), http://www.farm
landinfo.org/sites/default/files/FS_RTF_9-98_1.pdf. Missouri’s adoption of this
statute was part of a wider national movement for agricultural protection. Id. Between 1963 and 1994, every state enacted some form of right-to-farm nuisance law, in
hopes of protecting farmers from litigious neighbors and also to document the importance of farming to the community. Id.
321. § 537.295.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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qualifies for protected status under this statute may assign this protected status: it is alienable and inheritable.324
Missouri’s right-to-farm statute is still subject to the farm’s compliance
with “all county, state, and federal environmental codes, laws, or regulations.”325 Furthermore, a farm’s reasonable expansion may not include any
changes that create “a substantially adverse effect upon the environment,” “a
hazard to public health and safety,” or “a measurably significant difference in
environmental pressures upon existing and surrounding neighbors because of
increased pollution.”326 A farmer is also still liable for any nuisance claim
arising from negligent or improper agricultural operations and for any injuries
arising from pollution, water contamination, or overflow from the agricultural
operation.327
Thus, although this statute protects farmers in Missouri, it has clear limiting principles. It is also narrowly addressed to nuisance claims.328 The
right-to-farm amendment differs from the statute in that it, theoretically, provides much broader protections applicable to all sorts of claims and includes
fewer limitations. For example, forestry and urban operations are not currently covered by the statute, but very well could be by the constitutional
amendment.329 Additionally, the right-to-farm amendment may lift some of
the restrictions of the statute – though this is only if the court does not rely on
statutory tradition in its own construal of the provision.
Many other statutes or regulations that might approach “plainly and palpably” affronting the amendment’s general premise are specifically allowed
to, based on the amendment’s final clause asserting that the right to farm is
subject to duly authorized county powers.330 As discussed above, counties
may exercise the general police power in enacting local laws and ordinances.331
Other statutes would probably not be affected. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 441.280 allows a landlord to put a lien on his tenant farmer’s
crops for rent.332 It seems very unlikely that this could be successfully challenged under the right-to-farm amendment. The right to “engage in farming
and ranching practices,” while it may encompass putting agricultural products
on the market, would not supersede other contractual obligations, or suddenly
entitle farmers and ranchers to top dollar or affirmative market advantages
simply because of the nature of their product.333
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See supra Part III.A.3. See also MO. REV. STAT. § 243.240 (2000) (county
commissions to maintain efficiency and have management and control).
331. See supra Part III.A.3.
332. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.280 (2000) (“Landlord’s lien on crops for rent”).
333. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 35.
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Similarly, statutes allowing state public health boards to access farms
and ranches would probably still be considered consistent with the right conferred by the amendment. For example, Missouri Revised Statutes Section
196.555 gives the state milk board access to all Missouri dairy farms.334 Such
access probably does not clearly contravene the right to engage in farming
practices. And as far as environmental regulations are concerned, federal
statutes would obviously preempt here, so farmers and ranchers will still need
to comply with federal regulations.
Some additional areas of interest moving forward might be in the dissolution of marital relationships or partnerships: How might a court divide
marital or partnership property when one or more parties are farmers or
ranchers? Additionally, how might conflicts between two farmers be resolved? For example, if one farmer wanted to grow organic produce and the
neighboring farmer used pesticides that contaminated the other’s organic
operation, whose right would prevail? That is, the right-to-farm amendment
guarantees the right to “farm,” but in what way? These questions are difficult
to answer at this point.

IV. NEEDED REFORM
The Supreme Court of Missouri has explained that procedural requirements for constitutional amendments are intended to “(1) promote an informed understanding by the people of the probable effects of the proposed
amendment, or (2) prevent a self-serving faction from imposing its will upon
the people without their full realization of the effects of the amendment.”335
The available statutory challenges reflect similar goals.336 But these statutory
challenges may need some revision to actually effect their purpose given the
changing state of political affairs.
For example, Section 116.190, which allows ballot title challenges, was
enacted in 1980.337 In 2014 alone, appellate courts reviewed three times as
many Section 116.190 cases as in the first decade following its enactment. 338
This is probably due in large part to an increase in the number of initiative
petitions being submitted, with only sixteen in 2004, but 143 in 2012 – a sig-

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

MO. REV. STAT. § 196.555 (2000).
Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 11–12 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
See id.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West 2016).
They reviewed a single case between 1980 and 1990. Union Elec. Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, 678 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). And three cases in 2014. Seay v.
Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014); Sinquefield v. Jones, 435 S.W.3d 674
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014); State ex rel. Dienoff v. Galkowski, 426 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2014).
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nificant increase in the number of ballots available to challenge.339 This is
therefore a timely and developing issue.
With lobbyists becoming more involved in the petition initiative process
and correspondingly in the judicial contest process,340 Missouri may need
legislative reform of its election laws – or perhaps amendments to constitutional provisions governing amendment procedure. Certainly, the answer is
not to prohibit direct democracy, but rather, this Comment questions the adequacy of the existing legal challenges to Missouri constitutional amendments
when these amendments are enacted via a single election. The enactment of
the right-to-farm amendment showed how politically-charged campaigns fueled by interest groups could directly affect Missouri’s Bill of
Rights. Existing legal challenges in Missouri may not be sufficient to protect
the constitution from future, similarly political amendments that might
be more harmful to Missourians and contribute to governmental dysfunction.341 Missouri is at present a relatively easy forum for enacting state constitutional amendments, which might attract interest groups seeking a test site
for national proposals,342 or foreign corporations seeking favorable venues to
conduct business. Missourians should be able to subject such amendments to
strict procedural requirements, requiring judicial review if necessary to ensure
compliance.
Shoemyer’s and Dotson’s challenges to recent constitutional amendments highlight current inadequacies in the constitutional amendment process. In particular, the statutory limitation of ten days to bring a ballot title
challenge,343 but the (necessary) difficulty of bringing a post-election challenge, leaves ballot title challengers between a rock and a hard place. Because voters rely so heavily on ballot titles and summaries on election day –
with many voters not informed about the issues until they arrive at the ballot
box – judicial review of ballot titles may be one of the most important checks
on the political process.344
Perhaps to address the issue of mootness, in 2013 the legislature amended Section 116.190, governing ballot title challenges to automatically extinguish any action brought under that section that is not fully and finally adju339. Theodore, supra note 54, at 1421–22 “Of the 143 petitions filed in 2012,
sixty-one came from one of three entities and addressed one of three topics, giving an
appearance of ballot title shopping.” Id. at 1422.
340. See SELDEN BIGGS & LELIA B. HELMS, THE PRACTICE OF AMERICAN POLICY
MAKING 146 (2007).
341. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, The Constitutional Initiative in Montana, 71
MONT. L. REV. 325, 326–27 (2010) (quoting the Chief Justice of California, who
observed in 2009 that “in times of fiscal crisis ‘Frequent amendments--coupled with
the implicit threat of more in the future--have rendered our state government dysfunctional’”).
342. See John Slavin, The Future of Initiative and Referendum in Missouri, 48
MO. L. REV. 991 (1983).
343. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West 2016).
344. See Slavin, supra note 342; Theodore, supra note 54.
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dicated, including appeals, within 180 days of its filing.345 It provides an
exception for good cause, but only for court-related scheduling issues and not
any of the parties’ good cause claims.346 This section only seems to compound the difficulties of those who file a ballot title claim.
Judicial review during the political process should be limited, and the
answer to these issues does not seem to be allowing additional statutory challenges. The answer is also not to open up post-election challenges more
broadly, as the court did in Dotson. This undermines voter confidence and
creates the added expense of not only more post-election challenges, but also
the expense of ordering new elections.
But perennially moot challenges to ballot titles are not challenges at all.
If the legislature has recognized the importance of this judicial challenge by
codifying it in Section 116.190, they should also enable it to be legitimately
adjudicated. One way to do so might be to require that constitutional
amendments roll over to the next year’s ballot or require that they be certified
for a certain number of months before allowed onto the ballot.
Other options for reform not related to judicial review might be to
heighten the standards for constitutional amendment passages, though these
options would first require constitutional amendments, not simple statutory
amendments.347 The constitution might limit the governor’s authority to order a special election, which reduces the amount of time available for reviewing and challenging ballot titles.348 For legislatively-referred constitutional
amendments, Missouri might require a majority vote from both legislative
houses for two sessions in a row.349 Another way might be to require a supermajority popular vote, not a simple majority.350 Given the differences
between a constitution and a statute, Missouri would do well to ensure that
changes to its constitution are the result of an informed and reasoned democracy and not a rushed and uninformed mobocracy.351

CONCLUSION
The right-to-farm amendment may just reaffirm rights already available
to Missouri citizens. Even if it was intended to be largely symbolic, however,
the amendment may actually put a stop to future legislative regulation of
farming and ranching in Missouri, may overturn some existing legislation,
and may impose unforeseen affirmative duties on non-farming and ranching
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

2013 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.R. 117 (West); § 116.190.
§ 116.190.
See MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(b).
Id.
See id. at art. III, § 52.
See id. at art. XII, § 2(b).
See generally Aaron Zelinsky, Constitutional Amendment by Popular Vote:
Bad for Switzerland and California, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 2:50 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aaron-zelinsky/constitutionalamendment_b_374683.html.
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Missourians. It may well be the “wake-up call” for Missourians at large that
Proposition B was for the Missouri Farmers Bureau.352
A constitution is different from other sources of law in both authority
and subject matter. It is the highest source of law, as it is the creation of “the
people” themselves, and it embodies that people’s fundamental values.353 In
practice, while Missouri’s constitution is its highest source of law, its subject
matter is becoming increasingly devoted to the mundane, not the essential
and fundamental. For example, Missouri’s state constitution concerns itself
not just with Missourians’ freedoms of speech and religion, but also includes
a provision legalizing “charitable bingo” and provisions for establishing water pollution control.354
Now Missourians have also enacted a pre-emptory “right to farm” by a
bare majority vote. At the end of the day, the amendment is probably more of
an assertion or priority to farm rather than an absolute right. Still, even if it
only memorializes farmers’ right to farm as insurance against the possibility
of unfavorable legislation in the future, that could play out to be a significant
change. The enactment of the right-to-farm amendment threw a rock into the
lake of Missouri law, and no one knows for certain what its ripple effects will
be.
Direct democracy should be available to the people to enact such
change, but more public deliberation is needed before the enactment of the
provision. Because substantive review of a constitutional amendment is neither feasible nor desirable before an election, procedural safeguards must be
strictly followed to ensure that the Missouri Constitution is not unintentionally altered. At present, the legislature does not allow sufficient time for judicial review of the political process, based on strict procedural challenges, as
was made clear by Dotson. Additional time for the ballot preparation and
political process would allow for more reasoned and informed voters and a
more legitimate constitutional amendment process.

352. Mannies, supra note 29.
353. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90

MICH. L. REV. 761, 814 (1992)
354. MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 39(a), 37(b).
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